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Economies—Hong Kong as a Case Study 
Thomas K. Cheng*• 
Abstract: This article explores a competition problem that has been long 
neglected in the two major competition law jurisdictions, the United States and 
the European Union, conglomerate dominance or aggregate concentration. With 
their continental scale, the U.S. or the EU economies are unlikely to be dominated 
by conglomerates. However, conglomerates have been found to be common in 
small economies and emerging economies. Conglomerates no doubt have their 
advantages. Yet they also pose some serious economic power issues and distort 
competition in a variety of ways, the latter of which has been relatively 
unexplored in the literature. This article catalogs these issues and distortions and 
proposes two sets of responses to them: direct regulation of conglomerates and 
competition law enforcement. These two sets of solutions to some extent alleviate 
the detrimental effects of conglomerates. However, they do not get to the root of 
the problem, domination of an economy by large conglomerates. Using Hong 
Kong as an example, this article illustrates the application of these two sets of 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Conglomerates are a competition problem that has been long neglected 
in the United States and the European Union (EU), the two leading 
competition law jurisdictions in the world. Due to the size of their economies, 
they are unlikely to be dominated by any corporate group or groups, no 
matter how large these groups are. Yet there are a considerable number of 
countries in the world whose economies are dominated by conglomerates. A 
survey conducted by this author and collaborator Professor Michal Gal with 
the assistance of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
shows that a high percentage of the respondent countries are afflicted by high 
aggregate concentration (in fact, half out of the thirty-two of them are).1 Yet, 
in no more than twenty percent of them do their competition laws specifically 
address aggregate concentration.2 
One wonders why conglomerates emerge and why they are more 
prevalent in some countries than others. There are a number of explanations 
for this. One reason is the small size of the economy. Conglomerates are more 
likely to emerge in small economies because as a successful firm grows, it 
will eventually hit a limit imposed by the size of the market, which is 
constrained by the size of the economy. If it wants to continue growing, it 
must explore a new market (apart from overseas expansion). Over time, this 
firm will branch into more and more sectors until it eventually becomes a 
 
 1  Michal S. Gal & Thomas K. Cheng, Aggregate Concentration: A Study of Competition Law 
Solutions, 4 J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 282, 296 (2016).  
 2  Id.  
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conglomerate. This is especially likely if there is a dominant sector in the 
economy that dwarfs other sectors in importance, such as real estate, mining, 
or oil and gas. Firms that are successful in these sectors will have sufficient 
ammunition to branch out to other sectors. And the heft they have gained in 
their large home sector means that they will be very well resourced against 
rivals in the new sector. Hong Kong and Israel are some examples of small 
economies dominated by conglomerates. 
Emerging economies have also been found to have a high incidence of 
conglomerates. This may be due to the various advantages of conglomerates 
that will be discussed below, such as economies of scale and scope, 
overcoming missing institutions, risk sharing, and internal capital and factor 
markets, which are particularly relevant in the emerging economy setting. 
Firms tend to conglomerate to take advantage of these advantages. And when 
some firms start to do that, other firms may do so too as a preemptive 
measure. Lastly, conglomerates may emerge as a consequence of a deliberate 
government policy. The South Korean government was renowned for 
intentionally grooming conglomerates to drive the country’s industrialization 
effort. While they made important contributions to the country’s 
industrialization, the consensus is that they have outlived their usefulness and 
the country is still paying the price of that policy in the form of a high degree 
of aggregate concentration. 
Given that aggregate concentration or conglomerate dominance is 
common in so many countries, one wonders why so few competition laws 
have specific provisions to tackle it. One reason could be that no country 
seems to have found an effective solution to the problem. Japan and South 
Korea have tried some fairly prescriptive rules that directly regulate 
conglomerate size and their internal operations, but their effectiveness has 
been questioned. There are other ways to tackle conglomerate dominance. In 
addition to problems caused by their economic power, conglomerates are 
also more prone to a range of anticompetitive practices. Jurisdictions in 
which conglomerates dominate should be particularly vigilant against 
conglomerates. What this article seeks to explore are what are the advantages 
and disadvantages of conglomerates, what are the economic power and 
competition issues they raise, and what are the possible solutions to those 
issues. It then uses Hong Kong as an example to illustrate how a particular 
jurisdiction should deal with conglomerates under its competition law. Hong 
Kong is chosen because it is one of the latest advanced economies to have 
adopted competition law (in 2012). It is also a place where conglomerates 
have been a particularly serious problem; it has consistently topped The 
Economist’s Crony Capitalism Index for years, besting even Russia by a 
wide margin. Even though Hong Kong is chosen for illustration, the 
analytical framework put forward in this article can be readily applied to 
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This article is divided into seven Parts. After the Introduction, Part II 
outlines the various advantages of conglomerates, followed by a discussion 
in Part III of their various disadvantages and the economic power issues they 
raise. Part IV focuses specifically on how conglomerates are prone to distort 
competition through a myriad of anticompetitive conduct. Part V examines 
possible responses under competition law to the economic power and 
competition issues raised in the previous two Parts. Part VI applies 
competition law tools in the specific context of Hong Kong under the recently 
enacted Competition Ordinance. Part VII concludes the article. 
 II.  THE ADVANTAGES OF CONGLOMERATES 
Before delving more deeply into the issues, it is worthwhile to first 
define what exactly a conglomerate is. Khanna and Yafeh define a business 
group as consisting of “legally independent firms, operating in multiple 
(often unrelated) industries, which are bound together by persistent formal 
(e.g., equity) and informal (e.g., family) ties.”3 Khanna and Rivkin 
supplement this definition by observing that members of a business group 
“are accustomed to taking coordinated actions.”4 Some commentators 
distinguish between conglomerates and corporate groups, using the former 
to refer to a firm that operates in multiple sectors by way of internal divisions, 
and the latter to refer to a group of companies that do business in multiple 
markets.5 This article draws no such distinction. 
At this juncture, it is important to clarify the concepts of conglomerate 
dominance and aggregate concentration. The two of them share many 
similarities. Both are concerned with the extent to which economic activities 
and productive assets are concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
economic operators. Various measures of aggregate concentration attempt to 
quantify the control exercised by a small number of economic operators over 
the economy. However, there is a difference between aggregate 
concentration and conglomerate dominance in that the former includes the 
largest economic operators in its measurements, drawing no distinction 
between whether these operators are single-industry firms or multi-industry 
corporate groups, whereas the latter only focuses on conglomerates.6 
 
 3  Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?, 
45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 331, 331 (2007) [hereinafter Khanna & Yafeh I]. 
 4  Randall Morck et al., Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth, 43 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE 655, 671 (2005) (quoting Tarun Khanna & Jan W. Rivkin, Estimating the Performance 
Effects of Business Groups in Emerging Markets, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 45, 47 (2001)). 
 5  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 333.  
 6  This is important because some of the competition problems observed in Hong Kong for which 
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Aggregate concentration usually refers to the economic power issues created 
by the sheer size of economic operators. This article uses the term 
conglomerate dominance to refer to the anticompetitive potential of 
conglomerates in addition to the economic power issues created by them. It 
will mainly use the term conglomerate dominance for the sake of 
consistency. However, the term aggregate concentration will also be used 
when the distinction between the two terms is less important in the context 
and aggregate concentration is used in the literature being referred to. This is 
especially the case in the discussion about the measurements and 
quantification of economic control in the literature, which almost always uses 
the term aggregate concentration. 
Aggregate concentration is measured in a variety of ways. It is almost 
always measured in the form of the amount of something that is held or 
accounted for by a certain number of top firms in the economy. The choice 
of the number of firms is always somewhat arbitrary, and probably depends 
to some extent on the size of the economy. For instance, Berle and Means 
chose the top two hundred firms in their measurement of aggregate 
concentration. That would be appropriate given the size of the U.S. 
economy.7 However, for an economy like Hong Kong’s or Israel’s, the top 
two hundred corporate groups or large firms would probably account for 
almost the entire economy. Meanwhile, there are a number of variables that 
can be used, such as assets, employment, and value added. Berle and Means 
used assets as the variable, which, as Weiss observes, tends to overstate 
aggregate concentration, among other problems.8 Meanwhile, employment 
would tend to underestimate aggregate concentration, despite some of its 
advantages as a measure.9 Available employment data also do not allow for 
accurate measurement and will lead to estimation errors.10 Value added 
would be the most appropriate measure for aggregate concentration if one 
was concerned about the relative share of economic activity of large 
companies.11 Another advantage of value added is that it is comparable 
across sectors, regardless of the nature of economic activity.12 The problem 
 
conglomerates are allegedly responsible, such as multimarket forbearance and tying, would be much more 
likely to take place if the economic operator operates in multiple markets. 
 7  See Leonard W. Weiss, The Extent and Effects of Aggregate Concentration, 26 J. L & ECON. 429, 
430 (1983). 
 8  See id.; Lawrence J. White, What’s Been Happening to Aggregate Concentration in the United 
States? (And Should We Care?) 9–10 (NYU WORKING PAPER No. EC-02-03, 2001), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292649. 
 9  See Weiss, supra note 7, at 430.  
 10  White, supra note 8, at 10. 
 11  Id. at 8. 
 12  Id. 
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is that value added data are much harder to come by.13 Therefore, most 
measures of aggregate concentration one finds tend to be based on assets, 
market capitalization, or GDP. 
Conglomerate dominance is manifested in two main ways. 
Conglomerates may distort the economy by their sheer size, which may result 
in restricted access to capital for small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), crowding out of SMEs and entrepreneurs, and outsized political 
influence. This article broadly refers to them as economic power issues. They 
may also distort the markets by anticompetitive conduct, like every other firm 
in the economy. However, by virtue of their multimarket operations and 
superior financial resources, there are reasons to believe that they are more 
prone to certain anticompetitive practices. 
Conglomerates carry a variety of advantages that allow them to be more 
efficient in their operations. These advantages include reaping economies of 
scale and scope, overcoming the missing institutions problem, provision of 
an internal capital and factor market, risk sharing, sharing of brand goodwill, 
and facilitating access to the international capital markets. It is important to 
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of conglomerates as it would 
allow us to ascertain their net benefits to the economy. If they create net harm 
to the economy, regulatory intervention may be called for. 
 A.  Economies of Scale and Scope 
Conglomerates often benefit from economies of scale and scope. With 
their superior financial resources, conglomerates can ensure that their various 
lines of business operate at an optimal scale and reap economies of scale. Of 
course, there is nothing about conglomerates that render them uniquely 
capable of capturing scale economies. A single-industry firm with the 
requisite resources and market share can similarly benefit from economies of 
scale. Conglomerates, however, are probably more advantageously 
positioned to enjoy economies of scope. A conglomerate that produces 
multiple products that share a common technology, component, or knowhow 
can benefit from economies of scope by sharing the common element across 
the various production lines. Moreover, the different lines of business of a 
conglomerate can share their overhead costs, such as accounting costs and 
human resource costs. A conglomerate can also achieve bulk discounts in its 
purchase of various external professional services such as advertising, public 
relations, legal, auditing, consulting services by pulling together the demand 
of its various divisions and subsidiaries. 
Empirical evidence, however, does not provide overwhelming support 
 
 13  Id. at 11. 
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on the ability of group companies to enjoy economies of scale. Weiss reports 
that “[t]he large conglomerate acquisition of the 1950s and 1960s still 
controlled by the acquiring firms in 1975 had profits and growth rates similar 
to those of the industries in which they operated. There is little evidence that 
such mergers yielded important economies or market power.”14 Khanna and 
Palepu also find that there is no difference in the performance of group-
affiliated and independent firms in India.15 
 B.  Overcoming Missing Institutions 
Another advantage of conglomerates is that by providing opportunities 
for intragroup transactions, they obviate the need for transactions with 
external parties, which minimizes reliance on the legal and judicial systems 
and avoids problems with contract enforcement. Khanna and his coauthors 
have been vocal proponents of this strength of conglomerates. Khanna and 
Yafeh assert that “[l]imited contract enforcement, weak rule of law, 
corruption, and an inefficient judicial system should all lead to high 
transaction costs between unrelated parties. Under such circumstances, 
intragroup trade, within the context of long-run relationships supported by 
family and other social ties, may be relatively cheap and efficient.”16 This 
means that conglomerates should have a particular advantage over 
independent firms in countries in which legal institutions are especially weak 
and the rule of law cannot be taken for granted. There is in fact some 
empirical evidence supporting the notion that corporate groups are more 
prevalent in environments in which contracting is more difficult.17 Khanna 
and Palepu find evidence for the conclusion that “the most diversified 
business groups add value by replicating the functions of institutions that are 
missing in this emerging market.”18 Evidence from the Philippines is 
consistent with this thesis, while evidence from Chile and Indonesia is not.19 
On the whole, the evidence seems to point in different directions. 
 C.  Risk Sharing 
Conglomerates have at their disposal superior financial resources, 
 
 14  Weiss, supra note 7, at 448.  
 15  Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Is Group Affiliation Profitable in Emerging Markets? An 
Analysis of Diversified Indian Business Groups, 55 J. FIN. 867, 874 (2000) [hereinafter Khanna & Palepu 
I]. 
 16  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 341. 
 17  Id. at 348. 
 18  Khanna & Palepu I, supra note 15, at 887. 
 19  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 341. 
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which make market entry and risk sharing easier. Conglomerates can gather 
the financial resources of their various subsidiaries or lines of business to 
enter a particular market, which would allow them to enter markets that may 
prove too costly for their independent competitors. By virtue of their 
diversified operations, conglomerates can also spread operational risks 
across their different lines of business. Difficulty in a particular industry is 
unlikely to cause an existential threat to a conglomerate given its diversified 
operations. Again, there is evidence that corporate groups achieve risk 
sharing in some countries. Khanna and Yafeh find that risk sharing is a 
characteristic of corporate groups in some countries, such as South Korea, 
and to a lesser extent, Thailand and Taiwan.20 However, they do not find a 
clear relationship between the extent of group diversification and the 
prevalence of intragroup risk sharing.21 In contrast, Masulis and his coauthors 
note that there is a substantial body of evidence showing that risk sharing is 
an important consideration in the ownership decisions within a corporate 
group and that family groups benefit from the ability to finance high-risk, 
capital-intensive firms that could otherwise have difficulty obtaining external 
funding.22 
The flip side of risk sharing is the diversification discount. It is a well-
documented fact that companies with a diverse range of businesses suffer 
from a valuation discount as compared to their single-industry peers in the 
United States.23 Therefore, while diversifying into a range of businesses 
helps to spread the risks of operation, it also lowers firm value. 
Diversification can be both beneficial and costly to shareholders. It can be 
beneficial to the extent that the firm or the corporate group possesses certain 
attributes, such as unique managerial talent, technology, or group goodwill, 
which can be deployed to a range of industries. However, diversification can 
be inefficient if it is motivated by a desire for empire building. The evidence 
seems to be mixed as to whether diversification is value-enhancing or 
reducing. Masulis and his coauthors note that market value for assets and 
return on assets are both lower for group companies, family owned or 
 
 20  Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, Business Groups and Risk Sharing around the World, 78 J. BUS. 
301, 318 (2005) [hereinafter Khanna & Yafeh II]. 
 21  Id.  
 22  Ronald W. Masulis et al., Family Business Groups around the World: Financing Advantages, 
Control Motivations, and Organizational Choices, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 3556, 3579 (2011). 
 23  Philip G. Berger & Eli Ofek, Diversification’s Effect on Firm Value, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 39, 39 
(1994); Raghuram Rajan, Henri Servaes & Luigi Zingales, The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification 
Discount and Inefficient Investment, 55 J. FIN. 35, 35 (2000); David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 
The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment, 55 J. FIN. 
2537, 2537 (2000); Karl Lins & Henri Servaes, International Evidence on the Value of Corporate 
Diversification, 54 J. FIN. 2215, 2215 (1999). But see John R. Graham, Michael L. Lemmon & Jack G. 
Wolf, Does Corporate Diversification Destroy Value?, 57 J. FIN. 695, 695 (2002).  
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otherwise, than nongroup companies.24 Meanwhile, Khanna and Palepu 
report no group discount for conglomerates.25 In fact, in emerging 
economies, not only is there no diversification discount, there even seems to 
be a premium for corporate diversification.26 Claessens and his coauthors 
find a diversification premium for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand 
and a diversification discount for Hong Kong and Taiwan.27 This led Khanna 
and Yafeh to conclude that diversification discount is inversely related to the 
level of development of markets and institutions.28 Khanna and Palepu 
discern a U-shaped relationship between diversification and firm 
performance. They find that performance of group affiliates declines relative 
to independent firms as diversification increases, until a certain threshold is 
passed and then the performance surpasses that of independent firms.29 
 D.  Sharing of Group Goodwill 
As mentioned in the discussion of economies of scale and scope, 
conglomerates can share common costs and benefits. One of the things that 
a conglomerate can share across the group is group reputation and goodwill. 
By building a strong brand name for the group, a conglomerate can transfer 
the customer recognition garnered in one line of business to another.  This 
goodwill is particularly helpful when a conglomerate is entering a new 
industry. As compared to an independent firm, which would be unfamiliar to 
consumers, a conglomerate company can tap into the goodwill that has been 
accumulated by other group companies over the years and will be recognized 
by consumers right away. Group reputation is especially relevant to groups 
that compete internationally. It has been noted that “a brand name is 
extremely valuable in export-oriented economies such as Korea’s, where 
companies compete against established multinationals for a worldwide 
 
 24  Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3587–89. 
 25  Khanna & Palepu I, supra note 15, at 869. 
 26  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 336.  
 27  Stijn Claessens et al., When Does Corporate Diversification Matter to Productivity and 
Performance? Evidence from East Asia, 11 PACIFIC BASIN FIN J. 365, 379–82 (2003). The coefficients 
for SEGN for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are positive while those for Hong Kong and Taiwan 
are negative. Note that the results for these economies are statistically insignificant.  
 28  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 336. 
 29  Khanna & Palepu I, supra note 15, at 869, 882. In fact, the existence of a diversification discount 
and the evidence that family groups provide valuable support to group companies lead Masulis and his 
coauthors to conclude that “group affiliation is subject to an endogenous selection effect,” meaning that 
“groups use pyramids to fund particular types of firms that otherwise would find it difficult to obtain 
external financing.” Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3595. Therefore, there is an inherent bias in the 
sample of pyramidal group companies such that a direct comparison between them and independent firms 
would not be entirely appropriate. 
CHENG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017  6:21 PM 




Goodwill is not only a factor for consumers, it is also relevant to 
contractual counterparties. This is especially the case in countries in which 
the legal institutions are weak and the rule of law is suspect. A contractual 
counterparty can rely on the general reputation of the group in terms of 
upholding contracts and on the fact that a group company would be 
particularly hesitant to jeopardize the group’s overall reputation because of 
its ramifications for the entire group. As Morck and his coauthors note, 
“[w]hen institutions are weak, doing business with strangers is dangerous and 
unreliable. This impedes the operation of labor, capital, knowledge, and 
product markets. However, families with reputations for fairness and good 
management practices are especially sought after as business partners in such 
environments.”31 A group company may seem a more reliable contractual 
counterparty. 
There is evidence that corporate groups are economically motivated to 
cultivate their reputation and protect their goodwill. According to Masulis 
and his coauthors, “[c]omparisons of group and non-group firms along 
several transparency related dimensions show that group firms are highly 
visible to the market, suggesting that they have incentives to protect their 
reputations, rather than exploiting a lack of transparency.”32 Khanna and 
Palepu document how India’s Tata Group carefully manages its group 
reputation by defining standards and business values that need to be met for 
a group company to be allowed to use the Tata name and by sending 
independent professionals to conduct periodic business audits to ensure 
compliance.33 Group goodwill is an important asset that is carefully managed 
and strategically shared among group members to obtain a competitive 
advantage. 
 E.  Provision of Internal Capital Market 
Conglomerates perform the important function of providing an internal 
capital market for group companies. The conglomerate headquarters often 
allocate funds across divisions and subsidiaries and hopefully move internal 
funds to their most efficient use within the group. This internal source of 
funding is particularly important in countries where the capital markets are 
less sophisticated or liquid and where there are serious frictions in these 
 
 30  Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, The Right Way to Restructure Conglomerates in Emerging 
Markets, HARV. BUS. REV., Jul.–Aug. 1999, at 125, 129 [hereinafter Khanna & Palepu II].  
 31  Morck et al., supra note 4, at 672. 
 32  Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3580. 
 33  Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 133. 
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markets.34 This could be the case where there are high information costs in 
the domestic capital markets due to poor accounting disclosures or perceived 
corporate governance problems, which cause lenders or investors to demand 
high returns as compensation for the perceived risks undertaken. In fact, 
Almeida and Wolfenzon remark that weak investor protection keeps firms 
from raising external finance unless internal funds are available as seed 
money.35 As Khanna and Palepu observe, “[w]hen institutional mechanisms 
such as [financial intermediaries and financial regulators] are 
underdeveloped or missing, transaction costs rise, and the economy’s scope 
for growth is limited accordingly.”36 Information costs are minimized within 
a conglomerate due to the common ownership of the borrower and the lender. 
Common control of the borrower would give the lender access to accurate 
financial information about the borrower that may otherwise be unavailable 
to an external lender. Therefore, an internal lender will demand a lower rate 
of return and an internal borrower can obtain funds at lower costs. The 
internal capital market is not only valuable to young, risky, fast-growing 
firms that may face serious liquidity constraints,37 but it has also been shown 
to be similarly relevant for mature, slow-growing firms.38 
Empirical evidence confirms that internal capital markets exist within 
corporate groups39 and that corporate groups are more common in emerging 
markets where legal institutions are weak and the capital markets are still 
developing.40 India’s Tata Group is an example of how such an internal 
capital market works effectively.41 Evidence from both Chile and South 
Korea lends support to the notion that as financial markets become more 
mature and sophisticated, the benefits of being part of a diversified corporate 
group are eroded.42 In fact, the role of the internal capital market in helping 
to solve information problems has been confirmed in Japan as well.43 Hoshi 
and his coauthors find that in Japan, investments by independent firms are 
much more sensitive to liquidity.44 Furthermore, studies have shown that 
 
 34  Stijn Claessens, Joseph P. H. Fan & Larry H. P. Lang, The Benefits and Costs of Group Affiliation: 
Evidence from East Asia, 7 EMERGING MARKET REV. 1, 2 (2006); Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 
126; Morck et al., supra note 4, at 671. 
 35  Heitor V. Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business 
Groups, 61 J. FIN. 2637, 2666–67 (2006). 
 36  Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 126. 
 37  Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3560. 
 38  Claessens, Fan & Lang, supra note 34, at 17. 
 39  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 339. 
 40  Id. at 2. 
 41  Morck et al., supra note 4, at 689. 
 42  Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 133; Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 338. 
 43  Takeo Hoshi et al., Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese 
Industrial Groups, 106 Q.J. ECON. 33, 34 (1991). 
 44  Id. at 36. 
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“external capital availability is negatively correlated with the prevalence of 
family groups across economies, especially those organized under a 
pyramidal structure.”45 Therefore, the internal capital markets within 
corporate groups both help to remedy the illiquidity of the external capital 
markets and to reduce the information costs of lending. 
However, not all is positive about the internal capital market function 
of conglomerates. First, some studies have cast doubt on whether the 
provision of funding by a conglomerate will necessarily improve the 
profitability of member companies. Weiss reports that conglomerates do not 
seem to be allocating more funds to more profitable businesses and that firm 
product growth almost depends entirely on industry growth.46 Second, and 
more importantly, some commentators have argued that efficient allocation 
of capital within conglomerates may actually distort the overall allocation of 
capital across the economy.47 A controlling shareholder in a conglomerate 
has incentives to over allocate capital to internal projects and to ignore 
external projects that may be even more profitable than internal ones. Shin 
and Park have argued that the internal capital markets within Korean 
chaebols (conglomerates) are in fact inefficient and result in overinvestment 
in group companies with unprofitable investment opportunities.48 A related 
line of criticism is that the pooling of finances among group companies and 
the provision of debt guarantees by group companies for each other’s external 
debts obfuscates the economics of individual companies and subsidizes 
unprofitable businesses.49 In Japan, it has been observed that the internal 
funding from keiretsu [Japanese corporate groups] keeps afloat unprofitable 
businesses and results in inefficient use of capital.50 It has been asserted that 
the overall welfare impact of internal capital markets within corporate groups 
is ambiguous.51 
 F.  Provision of Internal Factor Market 
Apart from providing an internal capital market, a conglomerate can 
also provide an internal market for other factors of production such as labor 
and managerial talent. This, again, is an advantage that is more applicable to 
emerging economies. It has been observed that “[i]n economies where 
 
 45  Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3559. 
 46  Weiss, supra note 7, at 447.  
 47  Morck et al., supra note 4, at 675. 
 48  Hyun-Han Shin & Young S. Park, Financing Constraints and Internal Capital Markets: Evidence 
from Korean Chaebols, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 169, 171 (1999). 
 49  Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 132. 
 50  See Sadahiko Suzuki & R. Wright, Financial Structure and Bankruptcy Risks in Japanese 
Companies, 16 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 97 (1985). 
 51  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 339.  
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external markets for professional managers are thin and underdeveloped, a 
group’s internal market structure can lead to more investment in recruiting, 
training, and greater incentives for employees to develop ‘group specific 
human capital.’”52 In countries such as South Korea, India, and Chile, the 
availability of professional managerial education is limited while the demand 
for managerial talent far outstrips supply.53 What some corporate groups, 
such as Samsung in South Korea, have done is build an internal managerial 
market and provide extensive training for managers by bringing in world-
class faculty.54 A conglomerate can afford to do that because it achieves 
economies of scale in the provision of managerial training. Due to its size 
and diverse operations, the number of managers who need to be trained at 
any given point in time is bound to be large and its superior financial 
resources allow it to build a top-notch program. Another advantage of a 
conglomerate is that the general managerial skills of its employees can be 
deployed in different lines of business,55 especially when entering a new 
market. This helps to smooth market entry by providing a readily available 
pool of managerial talent. The now-defunct Korean chaebol, Daewoo, is a 
prime illustration of that.56 Khanna and Palepu find evidence that in Chile 
and India, the enhanced profitability of group companies is primarily due to 
advantages in labor and factor markets.57 
 G.  Facilitating Access to International Capital Markets 
Some commentators have reported that conglomerates have 
disproportionately good access to the international capital markets. For 
example, Indian group companies tend to enjoy privileged access to the 
international capital markets.58 This is hardly surprising, as international 
lenders will seek out trustworthy borrowers with sufficient assets as 
collaterals for the loans. And given the size and prominence of these group 
companies in the domestic economy, the international lenders will have 
greater confidence in their creditworthiness. First, these group companies are 
more likely than smaller domestic stand-alone firms to have a substantial 
international reputation, being often reported in the international press. 
Second, given the size of these conglomerates and the number of people they 
 
 52  Morck et al., supra note 4, at 672. 
 53  Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 129.  
 54  Id. 
 55  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 336.  
 56  Khanna & Palepu II, supra note 30, at 129. 
 57  Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, Policy Shocks, Market Intermediaries, and Corporate Strategy: 
The Evolution of Business Groups in Chile and India, 8 J. ECON. MGMT. STRATEGY 271, 275–76 (1999) 
(hereinafter Khanna & Palepu III). 
 58  Khanna & Palepu I, supra note 15, at 870, 885. 
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employ, the international lenders may rightly or wrongly believe that the 
conglomerates’ national governments will not let them fail if they run into 
financial trouble, because of the possible implications on domestic 
employment. For example, the Tata Group employs 600,000 people.59 
Samsung reportedly employed 275,000 people as of September 2014.60 
Third, conglomerates that are active in the international markets are more 
likely to have adopted international accounting and corporate governance 
standards, which will give their lenders greater confidence. Fourth, given the 
overall size of these conglomerates, the size of any particular loan will be 
quite small in comparison. So long as the lenders ask for a guarantee from 
the assets of other affiliates, their loans will benefit from a larger pool of 
collateral. Likewise, conglomerates are also likely to have better access to 
the international equity capital markets. A firm that has a global reputation is 
much more likely to be successfully listed in overseas stock exchanges than 
an obscure domestic firm. It will be easier for an internationally known firm 
to attract retail investors, which could be key to a successful listing. 
The question is, how does the domestic economy benefit from the 
improved access to international capital markets of conglomerates? To the 
extent that conglomerates’ access to international capital markets frees up 
domestic capital, other firms may benefit by having greater access to funds. 
It was mentioned earlier that the development of internal capital markets 
within conglomerates may distort domestic overall capital allocation. If 
conglomerates are now more willing to release their own capital to the 
domestic economy (perhaps because they are able to earn a greater return 
from lending to other domestic firms than the interest they pay in the 
international capital market), this overall domestic distortion will be 
alleviated. In a way, these internationally reputable conglomerates serve as 
conduits of foreign capital to the domestic economy. 
 III.  THE DISADVANTAGES OF CONGLOMERATES—
ECONOMIC POWER CONCERNS 
Conglomerates also bring with them a host of disadvantages, some of 
which are more of a corporate governance or general economic nature, some 
of which are more related to competition. The former ones include high 
agency costs, crowding out of SMEs and entrepreneurs, distortion of access 
to financial markets, overall welfare effects, and political economy concerns. 
Agency costs, and the related problems of pyramidal structure and tunneling, 
 
 59  See Tata Group, Tata Fast Facts, http://www.tata.com/pdf/Tata_fastfacts_final.pdf. 
 60  Ron Amadeo, Samsung has more employees than Google, Apple, and Microsoft combined, ARS 
TECHNICA (Sept. 25, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2014/09/samsung-has-more-employees-than-
google-apple-and-microsoft-combined/.   
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are corporate governance-related. The remainder of these disadvantages can 
be said to fall under the rubric of economic power concerns, meaning they 
are the inherent consequences of the size and breadth of conglomerates. This 
Part and Part IV will survey the various disadvantages and competition 
problems of conglomerates. Part V will attempt to offer some solutions. 
 A.  Corporate Governance Problems—High Agency Costs 
The high agency costs of conglomerates arise from the fact that many 
of them use the pyramidal structure, under which a holding company owns a 
stake in subsidiaries, which in turn own stakes in subsidiaries, so on and so 
forth. Assuming that at every level the controlling shareholder owns 50% 
plus one share, by the third level, the holding company will only have 12.5% 
of the cash flow rights.61 However, by virtue of its majority stake at every 
level, it will retain control rights over every subsidiary. According to 
Bebchuk and his coauthors, pyramidal structures combine the incentive 
problems associated with both controlled structure and dispersed ownership 
in a single ownership structure.62 It is believed that “the agency costs 
imposed by controlling shareholders who have a small minority of the cash-
flow rights in their companies can be an order of magnitude larger than those 
imposed by controlling shareholders who hold a majority of the cash-flow 
rights.”63 What makes matters worse is that in most public companies, a stake 
much smaller than majority is often enough to confer control because the 
individual shareholders seldom if ever vote in annual meetings.64 It has been 
estimated that a voting stake of ten to twenty percent is sufficient to confer 
control.65 For example, the famous Swedish family, the Wallenbergs, has 
voting control over ABB, an international engineering giant, while retaining 
 
 61  Pyramidal structures create significant agency costs because of the divergence between control 
rights and cash-flow rights. The problem is particularly acute when there is a project that generates 
substantial private benefits to the controlling shareholder, but only mediocre benefits for shareholders as 
a whole. The controlling shareholder will have the incentive to divert resources to pursue non-profit-
maximizing projects that generate significant private benefits, which he alone keeps. Meanwhile, the 
controlling shareholder will have little incentive to maximize firm value as he only retains a small portion 
of the value through his small cash-flow rights. This state of affairs harms existing shareholders by 
denying them profit-maximizing projects and also raising their financing costs. Outside investors will 
expect opportunistic behavior by the controlling shareholder of a pyramidal structure and demand a higher 
rate of return for it. See Morck et al., supra note 4, at 676.  
 62  Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The 
Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH CONFERENCE REPORT: CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295 (Randall K. 
Morck ed., 2000). 
 63  Id. at 296. 
 64  Morck et al., supra note 4, at 661–64.  
 65  Id. 
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only 5% of the cash flow rights.66 Claessens and his coauthors find that a 
20% stake is sufficient to control most Asian companies.67 Control is further 
augmented by placing family members in senior executive positions within 
the group, which is common in Asian companies.68 
Not every conglomerate, however, uses the pyramidal structure. 
Pyramidal structures are popular in some countries but not in others. For 
example, pyramidal groups are widely found in South Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and Mexico,69 while they are almost 
completely absent in Austria and Czech Republic.70 In their global survey of 
28,635 firms in 45 countries, Masulia and his coauthors find that about one-
third of corporate groups employ the horizontal structure while two-thirds of 
them adopt the pyramidal structure.71 Claessens and his coauthors find that 
only a quarter of non-widely held companies in Hong Kong are controlled 
through pyramidal structures.72 However, a casual survey conducted by this 
author shows that the pyramidal structure is very common among the leading 
conglomerates in Hong Kong. 
The controlling shareholder can also pursue what is known as tunneling, 
which consists of diverting assets and income to the higher-tiered firms 
within the pyramidal structure and dumping losses and liabilities to the 
lower-tiered firms.73 Despite it being a widely discussed phenomenon in the 
academic literature, Khanna and Yafeh note that the empirical evidence on 
the prevalence and severity of tunneling is far from clear.74 In particular, 
Cheung and his coauthors find that tunneling does not seem to be a serious 
problem among conglomerates in Hong Kong.75 This is consistent with the 
finding of studies that indicates that the control premium in Hong Kong is 
very low (in fact it was found to be negative), which suggests that there is 
adequate protection for minority shareholders, including from tunneling, in 
Hong Kong.76 
Finally, the pyramidal structure can also produce what is known as the 
entrenchment effect, which essentially allows the controlling shareholder to 
 
 66  Id. at 665. 
 67  Claessens, Fan & Lang, supra note 34, at 5–6. 
 68  Morck et al., supra note 4, at 665. 
 69  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 346. 
 70  See Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3568.  
 71  Id. at 3569–70. 
 72  Claessens, Fan & Lang, supra note 34, at 14.  
 73  Morck et al., supra note 4, at 679.  
 74  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 346. 
 75  Yan-Leung Cheung et al., Tunnelling, Propping, and Expropriation: Evidence from Connected 
Party Transactions in Hong Kong, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 343, 383–84 (2006). 
 76  Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 
68 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 334 (2003).  
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enjoy the private benefits of control robustly, without worrying about the 
possibility of takeover or reaction from minority shareholders.77 Morck and 
his coauthors describe control pyramids as “simple and highly effective 
antitakeover devices,”78 obviating the need for other antitakeover 
mechanisms such as the poison pill or staggered boards. This is a classic 
problem for a firm with a controlling stake, and there is considerable 
empirical evidence for it.79 However, what makes it worse for pyramidal 
structures is that such structures suffer both from this problem and the 
separation of ownership and control that afflicts firms with dispersed 
ownership. 
 B.  Distortion of Access to Financial Markets 
As explained earlier, the fact that conglomerates engender an internal 
capital market can distort allocation of capital economy-wide. According to 
Almeida and Wolfenzon, this is largely due to financial market imperfections 
caused by inadequate investor protection and the weak pledgeability of 
capital by a controlling shareholder to an outside investor in a weak investor 
protection regime.80 Intuitively, the distortion arises from the fact that a 
controlling shareholder cannot credibly commit to a certain return to capital 
following an investment. Therefore, whatever return the controlling 
shareholder commits to, it will always be subject to a discount. A 
conglomerate that may have capital to spare faces two options: one is to 
deploy the capital internally to a less profitable project, and the other is to 
lend capital to an outside firm that has a more profitable use of the capital, 
and can promise a higher return to the conglomerate than what the internal 
project can generate.81 However, after the inadequate investor protection 
discount, the return to the conglomerate may now be lower than the return 
from its internal project.82 The conglomerate thus would choose the internal 
 
 77  Morck et al., supra note 4, at 677.  
 78  Id. 
 79  See, e.g., W. Bruce Johnson et al., An Analysis of Stock Price Reaction to Sudden Executive 
Deaths: Implications for Managerial Labor Market, 7 J. ACCT & ECON. 151 (1985); Myron B. Slovin & 
Marie E. Sushka, Ownership Concentration, Corporate Control Activity, and Firm Value: Evidence from 
the Death of Inside Blockholders, 48 J. FIN. 1293 (1993); Paolo F. Volpin, Governance with Poor Investor 
Protection: Evidence from Top Executive Turnover in Italy, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 61 (2002); Igor Filatotchev 
et al., Privatization, Insider Control and Managerial Entrenchment in Russia, 7 ECON. OF TRANSITION 
481 (1999); Abe De Jong & Chris Veld, An Empirical Analysis of Incremental Capital Structure Decisions 
under Managerial Entrenchment, 25 J. BANKING & FIN. 1857 (2001); Mine Ugurlu, Agency Costs and 
Corporate Control Devices in the Turkish Manufacturing Industry, 27 J. ECON. STUD. 566 (2000).  
 80  Hector Almeida & Daniel Wolfenzon, Should Business Groups Be Dismantled? The Equilibrium 
Costs of Efficient Internal Capital Markets, 79 J. Fin. Econ. 99, 104–05 (2006). 
 81  Id.  
 82  Id. 
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project even though on an economy-wide basis, the external project would 
be more efficient. Inadequate investor protection hence creates a bias for 
internal projects, which reduces allocative efficiency even though the internal 
capital markets within conglomerates may be efficient.83 This allocative 
distortion would be particularly serious if there was a dearth of capital 
available to outside firms. In fact, Almeida and Wolfenzon argue that the 
more efficient is the internal capital allocation, the greater is the economy-
wide allocative distortion.84 
Knowing this allocation distortion in the external market, firms will 
have greater incentives to conglomerate in order to reduce their reliance on 
the external capital market.85 This in turn gives other firms the incentive to 
conglomerate preemptively, which creates a positive feedback mechanism 
for conglomeration.86 It has been observed that following the reforms of 
chaebols in South Korea, which included the breakup of the Daewoo Group, 
hitherto one of the largest conglomerates in South Korea, capital availability 
to independent firms improved.87 Such reforms are likely to face resistance 
because the existing conglomerates will use their political influence to lobby 
against improving investor protection to preserve their financing advantages. 
Morck and his coauthors observe that “to preserve their privileged positions 
under the status quo, such elites might invest in political connections to 
stymie the institutional development of capital markets and to erect a variety 
of entry barriers. These economywide implications can be serious.”88 They 
postulate that this phenomenon, which they call economic entrenchment, is 
a positive feedback loop, “whereby weak institutions place sweeping 
corporate governance powers in the hands of a tiny elite group, who then 
lobby for weak institutions to preserve their concentrated control over the 
countries large corporations.”89 
 
 83  Id.  
 84  Id. at 116–17. 
 85  Id. at 102. 
 86  Id. Preemptive conglomeration ultimately generates multiple equilibrium levels of 
conglomeration. Almeida and Wolfenzon further observe that “countries with intermediate investor 
protection might be stuck in an equilibrium with too much conglomeration. The same institutional 
environment can support two very different equilibria in terms of the degree of conglomeration and the 
efficiency of capital allocation. However, even if the low conglomeration equilibrium is socially superior, 
there might be no natural mechanism to allow the economy to move to the more desirable equilibrium.” 
Id. at 125–26. In that case, they suggest that direct government intervention, including a possible breakup 
of the conglomerates, may be necessarily to move the economy to a more allocatively efficient 
equilibrium. Id. at 126. 
 87  Id. at 129–30. 
 88  Morck et al., supra note 4, at 657. 
 89  Id. at 711. Another way in which conglomerates can distort access to capital is when its sheer size 
relative to the rest of the economy is such that they attain a certain degree of price setting power in the 
domestic capital market. In fact, Morck and his coauthors postulate that when a conglomerate decides 
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 C.  Crowding out of SMEs and Entrepreneurs 
The flip side of the advantage of a conglomerate’s superior financial 
resources is that these same resources allow conglomerates to squeeze out 
SMEs and render entrepreneurship increasingly difficult. It is obviously very 
difficult for SMEs to compete with a well-funded subsidiary of a 
conglomerate, which can reap substantial economies of scale and source 
inputs at substantial bulk discount. In a small economy in particular, if 
conglomerates are seen to embrace every profitable business opportunity and 
go after every profitable sector, it will have a deterrent effect on 
entrepreneurship. This is because budding entrepreneurs may reasonably 
think that as soon as they enter a promising line of business, the 
conglomerates will follow suit with superior financial resources. Morck and 
his coauthors assert that “entrusting the governance of huge slices of a 
country’s corporate sector to a tiny elite can bias . . . obstruct entry by outside 
entrepreneurs, and retard growth.”90 Weiss postulates that “if a very large 
firm enters a market made up of small firms, its size will intimidate the other 
firms in the market, and thus dampen competition.”91 
 D.  Overall Economic Welfare Effects 
A number of commentators have argued that conglomerates could lead 
to suboptimal economic performance and overall welfare loss. This is largely 
due to the size of the conglomerates in relation to the overall economy. If a 
small number of families control conglomerates that account for a substantial 
part of the economy, their suboptimal behavior may become a 
macroeconomic problem. Poor corporate governance in a select few firms 
take on systemic importance when the firms involved span the economy. This 
was very much the case in South Korea during the Asian Financial Crisis, 
when it was discovered that corporate governance issues in the chaebols led 
to extensive over-leveraging, which threatened to jeopardize the overall 
economy.92 Shleifer and Wolfenzon posit that the agency costs created by the 
 
whether to supply capital to an external user, it may consider the impact of the investment on its capital 
market power as the investment may allow the external user to accumulate wealth. Id. at 688. This may 
result in further allocative inefficiency in the economy, augmenting the distortionate effect described in 
the previous paragraphs. However, this is admittedly unlikely to happen unless the economy is relatively 
small or the conglomerate at issue is truly dominant in size.  
 90  Id. at 657. 
 91  Weiss, supra note 7, at 437. However, Weiss did not find much correlation between absolute firm 
size and the profitability of conglomerates, leading him to conclude that this problem, which he terms 
entrenchment, to be insignificant. Id. at 442. 
 92  Jong-Sung You, Transition from a Limited Access Order to an Open Access Order: The Case of 
South Korea, in IN THE SHADOW OF VIOLENCE: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE PROBLEMS OF 
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misappropriation of wealth by controlling shareholders raise costs of capital 
to the whole corporate sector and thus impede growth.93 It also has been 
argued that the capital market distortion resulting from conglomerate 
dominance may alter overall investment level, skew the capital expenditure 
across projects, firms, and groups, and may ultimately compromise economic 
growth.94 
There are divergent views on the overall welfare effects of 
conglomerates in the economy. Studies have been conducted on the relative 
performance of group firms versus independent firms. Their results are 
varied. Some studies report that pyramidal groups outperform independent 
firms in emerging economies.95 As reported earlier, there seems to be a 
diversification premium in some emerging economies, which lends strength 
to the argument that group firms have superior performance. In some other 
countries, the relative performance of group firms and independent firms has 
evolved over time. The Korean chaebols used to be traded at a premium until 
around 1994, when the premium became a discount.96 And these chaebols 
exhibited worse performance than independent firms during the Asian 
Financial Crisis.97 However, these firm-specific comparisons do not shed 
much light on the overall welfare effects of conglomerates as their superior 
performance may be due to the advantages they obtain, such as from 
distortion of the capital market, which would undermine overall social 
welfare. Some studies attempt to measure the overall effects of 
conglomerates directly. While most commentators seem to agree that the 
welfare effects of conglomerates are negative, Khanna and Yafeh argue that 
their impact on social welfare is ambiguous and circumstance-specific.98 
 E.  Political Economy Concerns 
Apart from problems of purely economic nature, conglomerates also 
raise political economy issues. These issues arise from the fact that 
conglomerates will inevitably attempt to influence the government to obtain 
their desired policy outcomes. As mentioned earlier, conglomerates may 
 
DEVELOPMENT 293, 309–10 (Douglass C. North et al. ed., 2013); see also Chee Keong Low, A Road Map 
for Corporate Governance in East Asia, 25 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 165, 166 (2004). 
 93  Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Wolfenzon, Investor Protection and Equity Markets, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 
16 (2002). 
 94  Morck et al., supra note 4, at 693.  
 95  See, e.g., Tarun Khanna & Jan W. Rivkin, Estimating the Performance Effects of Business Groups 
in Emerging Markets, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT J. 45, 57 (2001). 
 96  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 337. 
 97  Jae-Seung Baek et al., Corporate Governance and Firm Value: Evidence from the Korean 
Financial Crisis, 57 J. FIN. ECON. 265, 270 (2004). 
 98  Khanna & Yafeh I, supra note 3, at 334. 
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lobby the government to maintain poor investor protection so as to preserve 
their power and influence. They may lobby for policies that preserve or 
expand their corporate governance powers and to shield them from 
challenges by the minority shareholders in order to sustain their control. This 
is important because what determines their influence is not what they own, 
but what they control.99 So long as they maintain the current state of affairs 
under which they can control a company with 10% to 20% of the voting 
shares and can control companies further down the pyramid structure with 
even less cash-flow rights, they will preserve their political clout. Pyramids 
are said to magnify political influence the same way they magnify corporate 
control.100 In addition to lobbying for policies to help protect their corporate 
control, conglomerates will also demand measures that will shield them from 
competition, such as trade barriers or favorable licensing policies that help 
keep potential rivals out of the market. 
What makes lobbying by conglomerates particularly worrying is their 
size, which allows them to reap economies of scale and scope in political 
lobbying.101 As Ayal observes, “‘the larger the firm, the easier for it to 
overcome the fixed cost of lobbying, and the higher the returns will be’. Fixed 
costs are one of the contributing factors to economies of scale, and when 
returns are proportional to affected size . . . , size does matter.”102 He further 
observes that “[t]he larger the affected interest, the more prominent are 
economies of scale. The more interests affected, in multiple industries, the 
more prominent are economies of scope.”103 Given the size of a 
conglomerate’s business interest, the affected interest is obviously large. 
Therefore, the economies of scale will be substantial. And given the range of 
industries a conglomerate operates in, the economies of scope will be 
significant as well. 
Apart from substantial economies of scale and scope, which render them 
particularly effective lobbyists, conglomerates also benefit from financial 
advantages. With the substantial financial resources at their disposal, 
conglomerates can offer hefty upfront payments to government officials, 
which would be beyond the reach of smaller firms.104 Moreover, a 
conglomerate owner, by virtue of its common control, can effectively 
overcome the collective action problem and marshal the resources of the 
 
 99  Morck et al., supra note 4, at 674.  
 100 Id. at 657. 
 101 Adi Ayal, The Market for Bigness: Economic and Competition Agencies’ Duty to Curtail It, 1 J. 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 221, 225 (2013). 
 102 Id. at 227. 
 103 Id. at 226. 
 104 Morck et al., supra note 4, at 695. 
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various group companies to finance the lobbying activities.105 In contrast, a 
trade association that contains the same number of independent firms as 
members would face much greater obstacles due to the free-rider problem. 
The controlling shareholder of a conglomerate can also make use of tunneling 
to reap the direct benefits of lobbying while offloading the lobbying costs to 
minority shareholders.106 Such tunneling can greatly increase the cost-
effectiveness of lobbying for conglomerate owners. 
In addition, with their deep pocket and political connections, 
conglomerates tend to outlast independent firms, which allows them to 
operate as long-term repeat players in the lobbying game. Conglomerates can 
thus build longer lasting relationships with government officials and render 
their longer-term promises, such as a promise of postretirement employment, 
more credible. It has also been argued that family-controlled conglomerates 
have stronger incentives over time to use lobbying to maintain their economic 
position. This is because over time, the entrepreneurial abilities and 
managerial skills of the descendants of the founders of family-owned 
conglomerates should regress to the population mean.107 When they can no 
longer compete with their business acumen, these conglomerates will resort 
to political means to protect their competitive position. 
There is empirical evidence that shows that family-owned 
conglomerates exercise outsized political influence. Morck and Yeung find 
a significant correlation between signs of political influence and family 
control.108 Countries with a considerable number of family-owned 
conglomerates have poor compliance with tax law, high degree of corruption, 
poor judicial efficiency, inefficient bureaucracy, and high regulatory barriers 
to entry.109 Jacobs finds that “aggregate concentration of assets . . . has a 
strong negative influence on effective corporate tax rates.”110 The larger the 
firms in the economy, the greater their ability to lobby for lower corporate 
tax rate. His study leads Jacobs to conclude that “aggregate concentration 
leads to political distortions that may outweigh these technical advantages 
[of conglomerates]. It is dangerous in any democratic political system for a 
few to have political influence that clearly outweighs all others.”111 
Meanwhile, some studies have cast doubt on the correlation between 
 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 696. 
 107 See generally Francesco Caselli & Nicola Gennaioli, Dynastic Management (NBER WORKING 
PAPER No.  9442, 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9442. 
 108 Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society, 28 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY AND PRACTICE 391, 402 (2004). 
 109 Id. 
 110 David Jacobs, Corporate Economic Power and the State: A longitudinal Assessment of Two 
Explanations, 93 AM. J. SOC. 852, 852 (1988).  
 111 Id. at 877. 
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aggregate concentration and influence on policies.112 
 IV.  CONGLOMERATE DISTORTION OF COMPETITION 
Apart from economic power concerns derived from the sheer size and 
operation of conglomerates, conglomerates are also susceptible to a range of 
competition-distorting conduct, which, by virtue of their multimarket 
operations and size, conglomerates are better positioned than other firms to 
perpetrate. The particular anticompetitive potential of conglomerates has 
been relatively unexplored in the literature. It is important to examine this 
potential in order to formulate the appropriate competition law response to 
conglomerates. These include mutual interdependence, parallel exclusion, 
interlocking directorate, predatory pricing, tying, exploitative practices, entry 
deterrence or loss of potential competition, and cross-subsidization. The first 
three implicate multifirm conduct, while the remainder are unilateral 
behavior. It is possible to rely on traditional competition law tools to address 
some of them. For the rest, there are perhaps no ways to tackle them short of 
banning the corporate group structure or placing direct restrictions on the 
growth and internal operations of conglomerates. Of course, not every 
conglomerate will commit these anticompetitive practices. The argument is 
only that conglomerates are more likely than stand-alone firms to commit 
them. Some of these competition problems, in fact, are only applicable to 
conglomerates. 
 A.  Multifirm Conduct 
A conglomerate on its own obviously does not give rise to concerns 
about multifirm conduct. But when there are a number of conglomerates and 
they operate in multiple markets against each other, their repeated interaction 
in multiple markets makes multifirm conduct among them a serious issue. 
This is because conglomerates do not exist in isolation. If the economic 
conditions or historical development of a country are conducive to the 
emergence of conglomerates, there is usually more than one of them. If these 
conglomerate companies are simply engaged in price fixing or other forms 
of cartel conduct, existing competition law is well equipped to tackle such 
conduct. However, because of the repeated interaction among conglomerate 
companies, it may be easier for them to coordinate their conduct short of 
express collusion. This is where existing competition law falls short. 
Moreover, repeated interaction of conglomerates within multiple markets 
 
 112 See, e.g., Lester Salaman & John Siegfried, Economic Power and Political Influence, 71 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 1026, 1031 (1977).  
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also means that they are more likely to act in parallel with each other. If the 
parallel conduct excludes new rivals, what arises is what Hemphill and Wu 
have called parallel exclusion. This is a genuine competition concern but has 
thus far not been fully recognized as such. 
 1.  Mutual Interdependence 
Conglomerates have been said to promote mutual interdependence and 
to facilitate multimarket collusion.113 Bernheim and Whinston argue that 
“multimarket contact relaxes the incentive constraints governing the implicit 
agreements between firms, and that this has the potential to improve firms’ 
abilities to sustain collusive outcomes” and that “multimarket contact allows 
the development of ‘spheres of influence,’ which enable firms to sustain 
higher levels of profits and prices.”114 A number of scenarios can lead to such 
interdependence. The first involves members of conglomerates competing 
with each other in a number of markets. The idea is that when firms interact 
and compete in multiple markets, it will be easier for them to police a cartel 
formed in any particular market. Deviation in one market will invite 
retaliation in multiple markets, which will magnify the pain that fellow cartel 
members can inflict upon the cheater. 
Bernheim and Whinston, however, have criticized this theory by 
arguing that the possibility of multimarket punishment does not deter 
cheating; it will simply cause the cheater to cheat in all markets.115 They 
propose a different reason for why multimarket contact can facilitate 
collusion. They argue that so long as there are different numbers of firms in 
different markets or the firms attach more weight to future outcomes in some 
markets than in others, the conglomerates can pool together their incentive 
constraints across markets and use their surplus enforcement power in one 
market to discipline a cartel member in a different market.116 In particular, 
they argue that multimarket contact may allow firms to transfer their 
enforcement power from a rapidly growing market to a slowly growing 
market (the consequence of punishment becomes more important in a rapidly 
growing market because it happens in the future), from a market in which 
actions are directly observable and immediately punishable to markets in 
which there are substantial detection and punishment lags, or from a market 
 
 113 Mutual interdependence only arises in the conglomerate context when the same set conglomerates 
operate in the same markets, which obviously need not be the case. To the extent that different 
conglomerates operate in different markets, mutual interdependence will be less of a concern.   
 114 B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Multimarket contact and collusive behavior, 21 
RAND J. ECON. 1, 2 (1990). 
 115 Id. at 3. 
 116 Id. at 6–8. 
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with low demand to a market with high demand (it has been argued that 
collusion is countercyclical, and therefore it is easier to sustain collusion in 
low demand).117 
Apart from increasing the leverage of the cartelists over each other, 
multimarket contact can also facilitate collusion by increasing the level of 
trust among potential cartel members. When the conglomerates have been 
coexisting in the economy for a long time and interact with each other in 
multiple markets, they are more likely to have built up a certain level of trust 
among themselves over the years. This would make it easier for them to reach 
a consensus on the terms of collusion and obviate the need for direct 
communication before those terms can be reached. The level of trust is likely 
to be even higher if the conglomerates are owned by powerful families, who 
are likely to have personal relationships with each other. This means that both 
express collusion and tacit collusion would be easier. 
Mutual interdependence need not lead to collusion. It may merely cause 
the conglomerate members to compete with each other less. Conglomerate 
members may compete with each other in some markets and may supply each 
other in other markets.118 A firm in Conglomerate A (A1) may be less keen 
to compete rigorously with a firm in Conglomerate B (B1) because another 
firm in Conglomerate A (A2) supplies to another firm in Conglomerate B 
(B2), and B2 is an important customer of A2. A1 will take into account the 
ramifications for A2 when deciding how hard to compete with B1. A 
variation of this is if instead of A2 relying on B2’s business, B2 relies on A2 
to supply an important input. B1 may then hesitate to compete rigorously 
with A1 for fear of jeopardizing B2’s supply of input. In fact, it has been 
argued that, in the extreme case, A1 or B1 may withdraw from the market at 
issue, or if entry has not taken place, may refrain from market entry for fear 
of offending an important customer or supplier.119 
The supply relationship can also be used as a punitive mechanism to 
police a cartel in another market. A2 can threaten to cut off supply to B2 in 
order to induce B1 to abide by the cartel agreement. Whether this is likely to 
materialize will depend on the relative importance of the various markets to 
the conglomerates. If the sale by A2 to B2 is so large that Conglomerate A 
cannot afford to lose it, then the threat to cut off supply to discipline B2 
would not be credible. However, in that case, the threat to stop the purchase 
by B2 to discipline A1 would bite. Likewise, the threat to cut off supply 
would lack credibility if B2 can replace the supply easily, meaning that the 
input market for B2 is competitive. 
 
 117 Id. at 9. 
 118 Weiss, supra note 7, at 435. 
 119 Id.  
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Another variation of the above scenario is where different 
conglomerates are competitors with each other in various markets, some are 
strong in some markets but weak in others. In that case, a conglomerate may 
hesitate to push its advantages in the market in which it is strong for fear that 
it will be hit hard in the market in which it is weak.120 The leverage here is 
not a supply relationship, but a conglomerate’s relative weakness in a market. 
While the conglomerates stop short of outright colluding with each other, 
their mutual forbearance may deprive the markets of competitive vigor. 
Bernheim and Whinston go further and argue that “when firms differ in their 
costs across markets, multimarket contact can facilitate the maintenance of 
collusive prices through the development of spheres of influence.”121 In such 
circumstances, the firms will develop spheres of influence and take over the 
entire market in which they are more efficient while sustaining collusive 
supracompetitive prices in their markets.122 They further argue that the 
creation of spheres of influence facilitates collusion by raising profit on the 
equilibrium path and reducing the possible gains from defection.123 
There are probably other variations or permutations of the mutual 
forbearance scenarios described above. The central idea is that when 
conglomerates interact in multiple markets, their competitive decisions are 
no longer made within the context of the immediate market. These decisions 
take into account other markets in which the conglomerates operate, and the 
interactions in other markets may be used as leverage to restrain competition 
in the first market. Obviously, the more diversified are the conglomerates, 
the more likely that this will happen.124 It is possible that the number of 
markets in which conglomerates operate in an economy becomes so large 
that they come to accept a situation of live-and-let-live and an unspoken truce 
applies to all the sectors. 
Despite the intuitive appeal of the above theories, the empirical 
evidence thus far has not provided strong support for mutual 
interdependence. Based on student experiments involving conglomerate 
markets, Phillips and Mason conclude that conglomeration does not lead to 
increased cooperation across the board, observing that “what was cooperative 
becomes more competitive, and what was competitive becomes more 
cooperative.”125 Country-specific observations yield mixed results. 
Weinstein and Yafeh find that Japanese keiretsus competed vigorously rather 
 
 120 Id. at 436. 
 121 Bernheim & Whinston, supra note 114, at 14. 
 122 Id. at 12–13.  
 123 Id. at 13. 
 124 Weiss, supra note 7, at 436. 
 125 Owen R. Phillips & Charles F. Mason, Mutual Forbearance in Experimental Conglomerate 
Markets, 23 RAND J. ECON. 395, 405 (1992). 
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than colluded with each other in the 1980s.126 However, Kurgan-van 
Hentenryk argues that the Belgian business groups facilitated the 
cartelization of the Belgian coal industry between the two world wars.127 
 2.  Parallel Exclusion 
Parallel exclusion is a relatively new concept in competition law. It was 
put forward by Hemphill and Wu in 2013.128 They define parallel exclusion 
as “self-entrenching conduct, engaged in by multiple firms, that harms 
competition by limiting the competitive prospects of an existing or potential 
rival to the excluding firms.”129 The key distinguishing feature of parallel 
exclusion is the lack of a horizontal agreement among the perpetrating 
firms.130 There may be a degree of interdependence among the firms, as in 
the case of consciously parallel pricing, or the firms may be acting 
completely independently, albeit in a parallel fashion.131 Parallel exclusion is 
anticompetitive because it can be closely linked to price increases and can 
slow or block product innovation.132 They identify six mechanisms of 
exclusion: (1) simple exclusion, (2) recruiting agents, (3) overbuying an 
input, (4) tying, (5) resale price maintenance, and (6) most favored nations 
clauses (MFN).133 
Hemphill and Wu describe simple exclusion as where “the excluders act 
on their own, without enlisting assistance from other parties, to raise the costs 
of market entry. . . . Though the methods vary, their shared features are that 
the excluder does not need to contract with others to succeed and that the 
costs of exclusion are relatively low.”134 Recruiting agents refers to when the 
excluders enlist the help of third parties to help effectuate exclusion along 
the supply chain.135 Overbuying an input excludes potential entrants by 
 
 126 David E. Weinstein & Yishay Yafeh, Japan’s Corporate Groups: Collusive or Competitive? An 
Empirical Investigation of Keiretsu Behavior, 43 J. IND. ECON. 359, 359 (1995). 
 127 Ginette Kurgan-Van Hentenryk, Structure and Strategy of Belgian Business Groups (1920-1990), 
in BEYOND THE FIRM: BUSINESS GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  88 (T. Shiba 
& M. Shimotani eds., 1997). 
 128 See C. Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013).  
 129 Id. at 1189. 
 130 Id. at 1190. 
 131 Id. at 1196. 
 132 Id. at 1210. 
 133 Id. at 1201–09. 
 134 Id. at 1201. An example they give is excluding rivals through the standard-setting process. 
 135 Id. This second method of exclusion could be costly for the excluders because the agents will need 
to be compensated or threatened by the excluders for lost profit or opportunities forgone by virtue of 
taking part in the exclusionary scheme. However, such a scheme need not be costly if “there are multiple 
agents and no single agent bears the full cost of exclusion.” Id. at 1203. 
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depriving them of access to a crucial input.136 When parallel exclusion is 
undertaken through tying, the market at which the exclusion is aimed is 
usually the tied product market, and not the tying product market. Parallel 
resale price maintenance achieves exclusion by providing multiple 
downstream retailers an attractive profit margin, and hence a strong 
economic incentive to act in the interests of the upstream manufacturers, 
including to exclude potential entrants in the upstream market.137 Finally, 
MFN clauses achieve exclusion by making it difficult for a new entrant buyer 
to secure cheaper sources of supply because extending a low price to one 
buyer would entail discounts to all downstream buyers, which an upstream 
seller may be reluctant to do.138 
The existence of conglomerates is conducive to parallel exclusion in a 
number of ways. The first is the incentives of a prisoner’s dilemma created 
by parallel exclusion. Hemphill and Wu highlight two reasons for deviation 
in a parallel exclusionary scheme: the impulse to accommodate an entrant 
and shirking.139 One member of the exclusionary scheme may be tempted to 
defect if it is paid off by the entrant. Shirking will be an issue if the 
exclusionary conduct is costly and the benefit redounds to every other 
member of the scheme while the costs are borne by one member alone. As 
Hemphill and Wu note, under these circumstances the dominant strategy in 
a one-period game would be to defect.140 But if this game is repeated, it will 
become a coordination game. For conglomerates, they may be playing this 
game in multiple markets at the same time. Therefore, not only is the game 
repeated over time, it is also repeated across markets. They will hence have 
extra incentives to cooperate with each other. 
The second is by deterring powerful outsiders from disrupting the 
exclusionary scheme. A powerful outsider can undermine the stability of 
such a scheme by dictating terms that disrupt the existing parallel practice or 
by playing one oligopolist against another.141 In an economy dominated by 
conglomerates, the source of such a powerful outsider would be limited if 
most of the large players in the economy belong to one of the corporate 
groups. Members of a conglomerate obviously have no incentives to serve as 
the powerful outsider to disrupt the parallel practice. Even if such a firm 
exists, it may be less willing to challenge the existing parallel practice if the 
firm is somehow dependent on members of some of the conglomerates in the 
supply of input, distribution, or other aspects of its operation. Or such a firm 
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may simply be deterred by a desire not to mess with the powerful economic 
interests represented by the conglomerates, regardless of any actual 
commercial dependence. The minimization of challenge by a powerful 
outsider means that parallel exclusionary schemes among conglomerate 
companies are more likely to remain stable. 
The third way in which the existence of conglomerates is conducive to 
parallel exclusion is by making what Hemphill and Wu call recidivist 
exclusion more likely. According to them, parallel exclusionary schemes 
often may not be the result of deliberate planning but instead follow from the 
maintenance of customary practice.142 To the extent that the exclusionary 
pattern can be replicated across industries, the habit to follow it in one 
industry may spread to another industry. To the extent that parallel exclusion 
creates competitive harm, the prevalence of conglomerates would exacerbate 
the problem by rendering exclusionary schemes more likely to arise and to 
remain stable. 
 3.  Interlocking Directorate 
This third type of multifirm conduct is not anticompetitive in itself, but 
it gives rise to the potential for collusion or coordination by way of exchange 
of competitively sensitive information through the common director. The 
idea is that if the same person sits on the board of directors of two 
competitors, he or she may act as a conduit of information, deliberately or 
inadvertently, between the two firms, which will then use the information to 
coordinate their market behavior. Given that it would be incredibly onerous 
to monitor the flow of information through this common director on a daily 
basis, the more feasible alternative is to ban the same person from sitting on 
the boards of directors of two competitors altogether. 
Interlocking directorate is by no means confined to conglomerates. 
Stand-alone companies can share common directors as well. Interlocking 
directorate, however, has greater potential for harm because of the wide range 
of business of a conglomerate. Especially if the common director sits on a 
high level of the ownership chain within two conglomerates, it is possible for 
this common director to have a coordinative effect over a vast number of 
markets. Competitive harm will be much more widespread than if 
interlocking directorate happens between two stand-alone firms. 
 B.  Unilateral Conduct 
Apart from conduct involving coordination or collusion among 
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conglomerates operating in multiple markets, conglomerates are also prone 
to distort competition through unilateral conduct. In particular, the financial 
resources at the disposal of conglomerates mean that conglomerates are 
better able to withstand the loss that occurs during the predation period of 
predatory pricing. Conglomerates also stand to gain from the reputational 
effect of predatory pricing. There is bound to be spillover effect to other 
markets once the conglomerate establishes its reputation as a fierce 
competitor. Its competitors in other markets may hesitate to compete too 
aggressively for fear of triggering retaliation by the conglomerate. 
Conglomerates stand to gain from tying and other forms of leveraging of 
market power due to their multimarket operation. There are also reasons to 
believe that conglomerates will be able to take advantage of its heft and 
perhaps the reliance of their transactional counterparties in multiple markets 
to exploit these counterparties. Such exploitative practices are regulated as 
unfair trade practices in some jurisdictions. Conglomerates may also deter 
entry by their sheer size and may cross-subsidize their subsidiaries, thereby 
distorting competition in a specific market. Lastly, conglomerates may also 
lead to a loss of potential competition. 
 1.  Predatory Pricing 
Conglomerates enjoy two advantages in pursuing predatory pricing. 
First, because conglomerates operate in multiple markets, they stand to 
benefit by establishing reputations as fierce competitors that will meet 
competitive entries with cut-throat price-cutting in multiple markets. 
Therefore, they have greater incentive to pursue predatory pricing. Second, 
because of their deeper pockets, conglomerates are better able to withstand 
losses incurred during the predation period and therefore have greater ability 
to execute a successful predatory pricing scheme. And when competitors 
appreciate that, they will deem predatory pricing by conglomerates a more 
likely response to competitor entry and will be more deterred from attempting 
such an entry. This feeds back to the reputational effect scenario such that 
conglomerates may not even need to undertake actual predation to build that 
reputation.143 
The importance of reputational effect in predatory pricing has been 
widely noted.144 Kreps and Wilson demonstrate that reputation effect helps a 
 
 143 Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 
280, 304 (1982). 
 144 ORG. ECON. COOPERATION DEV., PREDATORY PRICING 7 (1989), 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/2375661.pdf; Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. 
Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategy Theory and Legal Policy, 75–80 (TILBURG MICROECONOMICS 
CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER VOL. 1999-82, 1999), https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/533021/82.pdf.   
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monopolist to deter a future stream of potential entrants once it has 
manifested its willingness to engage in predation strategy with an early 
entrant.145 No less an authority than F.M. Scherer has alluded to the 
possibility that this reputation effect applies to a conglomerate across 
multiple markets. He refers to: 
the demonstration effect that sharp price cutting in one market can 
have on the behavior of actual or would-be rivals in other markets. If 
rivals come to fear from a multimarket seller’s actions in Market A 
that entry or expansion in Markets B and C will be met by sharp price 
cuts or other rapacious responses, they may be deterred from taking 
aggressive actions there. Then the conglomerate’s expected benefit 
from predation in Market A will be supplemented by the discounted 
present value of the competition-inhibiting effects its example has in 
Markets B and C.146 
Milgrom and Robert show that in the presence of information asymmetry, it 
pays for the monopolist to pursue predation to deter an early entrant to 
acquire the reputation of being a fierce competitor.147 Information asymmetry 
is important because when firms are not completely sure about each other’s 
action, reputation, which may help to predict future behavior, matters.148 This 
reputation not only deters entry in the market in which predation is pursued, 
it will do so in other markets as well. These markets need not be related.149 
Milgrom and Roberts note that “the value of a reputation and the extent of 
reputation building increase with the frequency of the opportunities for its 
use.”150 This is particularly relevant to conglomerates because it means that 
the more diversified a conglomerate is, the more valuable it would be for the 
conglomerate to build a predatory reputation. This makes intuitive sense 
because the more markets in which a conglomerate operates, the greater is 
the payoff to the predation strategy, and the more likely it is that the 
conglomerate will recoup its loss. Importantly, the reputational effect need 
not even be that strong to deter entry.151 Therefore, conglomerates would 
have an overriding incentive to cultivate a fearsome reputation to deter 
potential rivals. 
Conglomerates are also better able to undertake predation strategies. 
 
 145 David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 
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Conglomerates have access to greater financial resources than stand-alone 
firms to withstand the loss that is sustained during the predation period. This 
corresponds with the deep pocket theory of predation.152 Moreover, as the 
benefit of predation is no longer limited to market in which it is practiced, 
the conglomerate will weigh the benefits across all markets against the loss 
to determine whether it would be rational to pursue predation. 
The deep pocket argument has been criticized for ignoring the 
possibility that the entrant can turn to the capital markets to finance itself 
when it withstands the onslaught of predation.153 Therefore, more 
sophisticated versions of the deep pocket model focus on the interaction 
between the entrant and the financial markets. For instance, Poitevin 
illustrates that because of capital market imperfections and a relative 
familiarity of the capital market with the incumbent but not the entrant, the 
entrant will be forced to take on debts to signal its quality to the capital 
market. Such action renders the entrant susceptible to predation.154 
Furthermore, Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan assert that five conditions need 
to be met for financial predation to succeed: (1) the target requires external 
financing, (2) the target’s external financing depends on its initial 
performance, (3) predation will be harmful enough that it threatens the 
target’s continual viability, (4) the predator understands the target’s reliance 
on external financing, and (5) the predator can finance predation internally 
or has substantially better access to external credit than the target.155 This 
extra gloss of financial market imperfection notwithstanding, ultimately what 
matters is that the predator has greater financial resources to withstand the 
loss. Conglomerates have greater availability of internal funding and better 
access to external domestic funding. Conglomerates also have better access 
to the international capital markets. Overall, the financial advantage of a 
conglomerate over a stand-alone firm would be substantial. 
Three comments are in order. First, all this discussion about the relative 
strength of a conglomerate predator versus its target only holds true if the 
target is not a stand-alone firm of a substantial size. If the target was another 
conglomerate company, the financial advantage would depend on the relative 
financial strength of the two conglomerates. But the decisive financial 
advantage would be lost and one can no longer be as confident about the 
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predator’s likelihood of success. Even if the target was a stand-alone firm, it 
need not be small. The national telephone monopolist may operate in only 
one industry, but it is likely to dwarf many firms in the economy. Second, 
the deep pocket theory of predation is premised on imperfections in the 
capital markets. Given that capital markets in developing countries are often 
less sophisticated, market imperfections abound, which means predation 
strategies are more likely to succeed.156 Finally, if predatory pricing is being 
used as a parallel exclusion strategy, it will need to be pursued. 
 2.  Tying 
Tying and other forms of leveraging of market power require the 
practicing firm to operate in multiple markets, often of related products, such 
as complements. Obviously, conglomerates are not the only ones that offer 
multiple products. A stand-alone firm can also offer complementary or 
related products. Yet it remains true that the wide scope of a conglomerate’s 
operations means that it is bound to have a wider range of product offering 
than a stand-alone firm. The wide product range presents greater 
opportunities for tying or other forms of leveraging of market power. 
Although the relationship between conglomerates and tying does not 
seem to have been deeply explored in the academic literature, the possibility 
for tying offered by conglomerate operation is well recognized under EU 
competition law. The 2008 EU Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines contain a 
detailed discussion of how a conglomerate merger will give rise to tying 
concerns.157 In the Guidelines, the European Commission focuses on ability 
to foreclose, incentives to foreclose, and competitive impact. This 
relationship was further explored in detail in a number of cases, such as 
Commission v. Tetra Laval158 and General Electric v. Commission.159  
Although the courts’ focuses were on issues more specific to the merger 
review context, such as the likelihood of the alleged conduct postmerger and 
 
 156 Finally, it should be noted that the above referenced theories of predatory pricing fall under the 
rubric of the Strategic Theory, which incorporates game theory in the analysis. Many of these Strategic 
Theory models manage to show competitive harm from predation strategies. However, their conclusion 
is highly sensitive to their assumptions (though to a lesser extent true for the reputational effect models) 
and would no longer be valid if the real-world situation deviates from the specifications in the model. For 
a critique of these game-theoretic models of predatory pricing, see Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, 
Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory, 89 GEO. L.J. 2475 (2001). 
 157 Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings, 2008 O.J. (C 265) 6, paras. 93–118, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:265:0006: 
0025:en:PDF.  
 158 Case C-12/03 P, Comm’n v. Tetra Laval, 2005 E.C.R. I-987. 
 159 Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-5575. 
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whether the fact that the alleged conduct can be prosecuted after the fact 
obviates the need for intervention at the merger review stage, the thrust of 
the cases was a recognition that expansion of a conglomerate’s product scope 
will create more opportunities for tying. 
In fact, some older U.S. cases have recognized another form of 
leveraging of market power, reciprocity, as a possible theory of harm in 
conglomerate mergers.160 Reciprocity refers to a situation where Firm A is a 
buyer of Firm B which in turns sells to another division of Firm A. 
Reciprocity could be anticompetitive if the Firm A withholds purchases from 
Firm B unless Firm B also purchases from Firm A. Although it is not entirely 
clear whether reciprocity remains a viable theory of harm in conglomerate 
merger cases (in fact, it is not clear whether conglomerate mergers still attract 
any antitrust scrutiny in the U.S.), these old cases remain relevant in their 
recognition of the possibility of leveraging of market power in the 
conglomerate context. 
 3.  Exploitative Practices by Conglomerate Companies 
Conglomerate companies sometimes make use of their market power or 
bargaining power to exploit contractual counterparties.161 If a contractual 
counterparty relies on businesses with a number of conglomerate companies, 
these companies can pool together their bargaining power to extract better 
bargaining terms from the counterparty. In fact, these companies may push 
the bargain so hard that the contractual terms become exploitative. Such 
exploitation of contractual counterparties could be a regulatory concern. U.S. 
antitrust law does not regulate exploitative practices. EU competition law 
does, but mostly only in the realm of excessive pricing.162 Beyond that EU 
law has largely adopted a hands-off approach. The competition law or related 
laws of a number of jurisdictions, such as France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and 
Korea, however, do regulate such exploitative practices. In Germany and 
France, the area of law is known as abuse of economic dependence or 
dependency.163 In Japan and Korea, it is called abuse of superior bargaining 
 
 160 E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).  
 161 It has been recognized that bargaining power can ultimately come from market power. See 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to Innovate After 
MedImmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 971, 987 (2009). 
 162 RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 759–69 (8th ed. 2015). 
 163 See Mor Bakhoum, Abuse without Dominance in Competition: Abuse of Economic Dependence 
and its Interface with Abuse of Dominance 8–9 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Academic Society for Competition Law), http://ascola-tokyo-conference-2015.meiji.jp/pdf/ 
ConferencePapers/General%20Session%202/Bakhoum_abuse%20of%20economic%20dependence%20
ASCOLA%202015%2013%205%202015.pdf; Florian Wagner-von Papp, Comparative Antitrust 
Federalism and the Error-Cost Framework: Rhetoric and Reality: You Protect Competitors, We Protect 
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position.164 What follows is a brief exposition of the kind of exploitative 
practices that have been addressed in South Korea, which has one of the most 
severe problems with conglomerates, also known as chaebols. 
Article 23 of the South Korean Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade 
Act (MRFTA) prohibits “trading by unjustly using a superior bargaining 
position.”165 The law enumerates five instances of abuse of superior 
bargaining position, namely forced purchase, forced provision of benefit, 
imposition of sales target, imposition of disadvantage, and interference with 
business management and operations. Imposition of disadvantage is defined 
as an “[a]ct of causing a disadvantage in the process of carrying out the trade, 
setting or changing the trading condition to the disadvantage of the 
counterpart using methods other than . . . forced purchase, forced provision 
of benefit, and imposed sales target.”166 
In the Seoul City Gas case, the defendant forced the counterparty 
customer service centers to purchase specific gifts for their employees, and 
was found by the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) to have committed 
a forced purchase.167 In the LG Electronics case, the defendant required its 
agent stores, which referred customers to the defendant, to be jointly liable 
for nonpayment by the customers. The KFTC ruled that the conduct was an 
unjust imposition of disadvantage because it unfairly passed on customer 
default risk to the agent stores against the will of the stores, and because the 
conduct deviated from the common practices in the industry.168 The LG 
Group is one of the major conglomerates in South Korea.169 In the Hyundai 
Department Store case, Hyundai compelled its suppliers to share the login 
information on an information portal that would allow Hyundai to check the 
sales records of its competitors in real-time. The KFTC ruled that the conduct 
 
Competition—Except When We Protect Competitors, in WILLIAM E. KOVACIC: AN ANTITRUST TRIBUTE 
LIBER AMICORUM—VOLUME II 23, 55 (Nicolas Charbit & Elisa Ramundo eds., 2014). 
 164 Thomas K. Cheng & Michal S. Gal, Superior Bargaining Power: Dealing with Aggregate 
Concentration Concerns, in ABUSE OF DOMINANCE IN COMPETITION LAW  (Paul Nihoul & Iwakazu 
Takahashi eds., forthcoming) (on file with author).  
 165 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Act No. 3320,1980, art. 23(1)4, (S. Kor.), translated in 
Korea Fair Trade Commission online database, http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command= 
getList&type_cd=62&pageId=0401. 
 166 Enforcement Decree of The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Table 1–2, translated in 
Korea Fair Trade Commission online database, http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command= 
getList&type_cd=62&pageId=0401. 
 167 Seouldo sigaseu(ju)ui geolaesangjiwinam-yonghaeng-wie daehan geon [Abuse of Superior 
Bargaining Position by Seoul City Gas Co. Ltd.], Korea Fair Trade Commission, Case 2013-1622, 
Resolution 2014-105, at paras. 51–62 (May 8, 2014) (S. Kor.) (translation on file with author). 
 168  Eljijeonja(ju) geolaesangjiwinam-yonghaeng-wie daehan geon [Abuse of Superior Bargaining 
Position by LG Electronics Co. Ltd.], Korea Fair Trade Commission, Case 2011-2555, Resolution 2014-
069, at § 2.C.2).B) (Apr. 3, 2014) (S. Kor.) (translation on file with author). 
 169 See LG Corp, http://www.lgcorp.com/about/affiliatesList.dev (last visited Sept. 17, 2016). 
CHENG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017  6:21 PM 
Conglomerate Dominance in Small and Emerging Economies 
37:35 (2017) 
71 
was an unfair interference with business operations because it would force 
the suppliers to divulge accurate sales information of competing department 
stores to Hyundai and would force suppliers to take part in costly and 
ineffective sales promotion events to the detriment of the suppliers.170 
Hyundai is another leading conglomerate in the country. 
Not only have the chaebols been regularly found to have abused their 
superior bargaining position, the KFTC has also expressly linked the notion 
of superior bargaining position to conglomerate membership. In the 
Lotte.com case, the KFTC buttressed its conclusion of a superior bargaining 
position on the grounds that the defendant was part of a conglomerate. In 
finding that Lotte.com had a superior bargaining position, the KFTC 
emphasized that it was one of the seventy-seven companies affiliated with 
the Lotte Conglomerate.171 The KFTC observed that “the suppliers’ business 
activities, such as the expansion of their businesses and promotion of their 
products, would be inevitably subject to the influence of their trades with the 
defendant, who has connections with the powerful conglomerate.”172 
 4.  Entry Deterrence or Loss of Potential Competition 
Conglomerates may deter entry into markets and cause loss of potential 
competition. A number of mechanisms through which conglomerates may do 
so have been delineated above, such as through parallel exclusion or building 
a predatory reputation. It has been noted that conglomerates may deter entry 
without any overt action, simply by virtue of its vastness. Ayal notes that “in 
order to challenge a business group with economic power, a competitor must 
not only enter the relevant product markets, but also create a network of 
contacts and input providers, well beyond the obvious production facilities 
and marketing venues.”173 
It is, however, important not to overstate this problem. Regardless of 
who one’s competitors are, entering a new market always entails building 
new business connections, supplier networks, and distribution networks. It is 
unlikely that the obstacles become greater simply because one’s competitors 
are conglomerate companies. Conglomerate companies do not always 
achieve greater entry deterrent effect. In fact, Cestone and Fumagalli show 
 
 170 Jusighoesa hyeondaebaeghwajeom-ui geolaesangjiwinam-yonghaeng-wie daehan geon [Abuse of 
Superior Bargaining Position by Hyundai Department Store, Inc.], Korea Fair Trade Commission, Case 
2008-1962, Resolution 2008-317, at § 2.C.(3)–(4) (Dec. 4, 2008) (S. Kor.) (translation on file with author). 
 171 (ju)losdedaskeom-ui geolaesangjiwinam-yonghaeng-wie daehan geon [Abuse of Superior 
Bargaining Position by Lotte.com Co. Ltd.], Korea Fair Trade Commission, Case 2012-0591, Resolution 
2014-037, at § 2.C.2).A) (Jan. 22, 2014) (S. Kor.) (translation on file with author). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Ayal, supra note 101, at 230.  
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that internal markets do not always help conglomerate companies to deter 
entry; under certain conditions, they may actually be softer than stand-alone 
firms.174 However, it is possible that it is harder to build essential business 
connections when facing conglomerate competitors. This could be true if the 
economy is so controlled by conglomerates that most of the supplier network 
and distribution network are in the hands of conglomerates. There may be an 
understanding among them to restrict access to these resources only to fellow 
conglomerates. Or even if suppliers and distributors are independent, they 
can be so reliant on business from conglomerates that they are susceptible to 
conglomerate pressure to limit themselves to dealing with other 
conglomerates. 
That conglomerates, or to put it more precisely conglomerate mergers, 
can result in loss of potential competition is undisputed. Loss of potential 
competition as a theory of harm in conglomerate mergers is widely accepted. 
Although conglomerate mergers have not been the enforcement focus of the 
Agencies for quite some time, there remain a slew of U.S. Supreme Court 
cases from decades ago that apply various potential competition theories to 
conglomerate mergers.175 The 1984 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
issued by the Department of Justice articulates the rationale for regulating 
conglomerate mergers on potential competition grounds as follows: 
In some circumstances, the non-horizontal merger of a firm already in 
a market (the “acquired firm”) with a potential entrant to that market 
(the “acquiring firm”) may adversely affect competition in the 
market. . . . By eliminating a significant present competitive threat 
that constrains the behavior of the firms already in the market, the 
merger could result in an immediate deterioration in market 
performance. . . . [Furthermore,] [b]y eliminating the possibility of 
entry by the acquiring firm in a more procompetitive manner, the 
merger could result in a lost opportunity for improvement in market 
performance resulting from the addition of a significant competitor.176 
If loss of potential competition is a concern for conglomerate mergers, it can 
be tackled relatively easily through merger review. It does not require direct 
intervention on the structure or market behavior of conglomerates and merely 
requires us to restrict their growth by acquisition under some circumstances. 
 
 174 Giacinta Cestone & Chiara Fumagalli, The Strategic Impact of Resource Flexibility in Business 
Groups, 36 RAND J. ECON. 193, 207 (2005). 
 175 See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); United States v. Marine 
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974). 
 176 Dep’t of Justice 1984 Merger Guidelines, § 4.1, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 13,103 [hereinafter 
1984 Merger Guidelines]. 
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 5.  Cross-Subsidization 
Cross-subsidization refers to the subsidization of one line of business or 
subsidiary by another line of business or subsidiary within a conglomerate. 
Although it could be viewed in some sense as a strength in that conglomerate 
companies are well supported financially, cross-subsidization could lead to 
resource misallocation because one line of business within a conglomerate is 
no longer responsible for its own profit and loss. The cross-transfer of funds 
from one line of business to another allows an otherwise inefficient or loss-
making business to survive, resulting in inefficient use of resources. It also 
results in distortion of competition because competitors within a market no 
longer compete with the resources and profit they generate within that 
market. Competition is distorted when a competitor that would have run out 
of cash and been forced out of the market under normal circumstances is 
artificially propped up by external funding. The market is saddled with an 
inefficient producer supplying substandard output, which the market would 
be better off without. Short of preventing the exit of an inefficient firm, cross-
subsidization also gives conglomerate companies better ability to withstand 
a short-term competitive threat in a market.177 However, cross-subsidization 
has also been said to be procompetitive by allowing a conglomerate company 
to be a more effective entrant into a new market.178 
Cross-subsidization has often been studied from a corporate finance 
perspective. The question posed is usually whether conglomerates lose value 
by engaging in cross-subsidization.179 Some commentators have found that 
conglomerates do lose value by engaging in inefficient cross-
subsidization.180 From a competition perspective, cross-subsidization most 
often arises as an issue in the regulated industries. For example, it has been 
featured in a few European cases in which the postal service allegedly 
subsidized its parcel delivery service, which is in competition with private 
providers, with other sources of revenue or direct subsidies.181 In addition, 
cross-subsidization has been examined in the telecom sector182 and electricity 
 
 177 ERIC A. SCHUTZ, MARKETS AND POWER: THE 21ST CENTURY COMMAND ECONOMY 79 (2001). 
 178 Id. 
 179 See Berger & Ofek, supra note 23, at 58; Margaret Meyer, Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 
Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes, 1 J. ECON. MGMT. STRATEGY 9 
(1992); Iman van Lelyveld & Klaas Knot, Do financial conglomerates create or destroy value” Evidence 
from the EU (DNB WORKING PAPER No. 174/2008, 2008), http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/ 
Working%20paper%20174_tcm46-175062.pdf. 
 180 Berger & Ofek, supra note 23 at 58; van Lelyveld & Knot, supra note 179, at 14.  
 181 Case C-39/94, SFEI v. La Poste, 1996 E.C.R. I-3547; Case C-399/08, P Comm’n v. Deutsche Post 
AG, 2010 E.C.R. I-7862. 
 182 Steve G. Parsons, Cross-Subsidization in Telecommunications, 13 J. REG. ECON. 157 (1998); 
Kenneth C. Baseman, Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization in Regulated Markets, in STUDIES IN PUBLIC 
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sector.183 Within competition law, the discussion of cross-subsidization often 
arises in the context of predatory pricing.184 It has been explored in the 
context of below-cost pricing practiced by multiproduct firms in competitive 
markets.185 However, these multiproduct firms are not meant to refer to 
conglomerates, but stand-alone firms, such as supermarkets, that sell multiple 
products. Simple cross-subsidization of a line of business (within a 
conglomerate or not) absent predatory pricing outside of the regulated 
industry context has not been treated as a stand-alone violation of 
competition. Yet commentators have noted the distortionary effect of cross-
subsidization in this context. Walter and Brock observe that cross-
subsidization means that “the large conglomerate’s market ‘success’ may be 
due primarily to its ‘deep pocket’ rather than superior efficiency or 
innovativeness.”186 South Korea is one of few jurisdictions that place 
restrictions on intragroup transactions in its competition law, which will be 
discussed in greater detail below. 
 V.  POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO CONGLOMERATE DOMINANCE 
A number of responses are possible to the problems described above. 
Some of these problems are inherent in the size and internal operations of 
conglomerates. It would be very difficult to alleviate these concerns through 
regulations of their market behavior. There will need to be direct restrictions 
on their growth and internal operations. Japan and Korea have been at the 
forefront of such direct regulation of conglomerates. The discussion below 
will borrow heavily from their experiences. In deciding whether to adopt 
such restrictions, there needs to be a careful holistic assessment of the net 
benefits of conglomerates to the local economy.187 The effectiveness of these 
measures also needs to be considered. The consensus in Korea, which is the 
 
REGULATION 329 (Gary Fromm, ed., 1981). 
 183 SALLY HUNT, MAKING COMPETITION WORK IN ELECTRICITY 60 (2002). 
 184 Cyril Ritter, Does the Law of Predatory Pricing and Cross-Subsidization Need a Radical Rethink?, 
27 World Competition 613 (2004); John Temple Lang & Robert O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate 
Competition: How to Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82 EC, 26 Fordham Int’l L.J. 83 (2002); 
Thomas W. Gilligan & Michael L. Smirlock, Predation and Cross-Subsidization in the Value Maximizing 
Multiproduct Firm, 50 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 37 (1983). 
 185 Zhijun Chen & Patrick Rey, Competitive Cross-Subsidization (Toulouse School of Econ., Working 
Paper No. IDEI-808, 2013), http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/2013/wp_idei_808.pdf.  
 186 WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W. BROCK, THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND 
GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 176 (2d ed. 2004). 
 187 In fact, one may argue that not all of the advantages of conglomerates should count toward the 
determination of their net social benefits. Many of these advantages, such as sharing of goodwill and 
economies of scale and scope, accrue to the firm, and do not necessarily benefit society in general. One 
may argue that these advantages should not be given credit unless there is evidence that they are passed 
onto consumers or otherwise shared with society at large. 
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jurisdiction that has most actively applied direct regulation of conglomerates 
in recent years, is that these measures have not been successful in reining in 
conglomerates in the country.188 Although this does not mean that these 
measures may not work in other jurisdictions. Finally, even if it is decided 
that these restrictions should be adopted, one should make sure that there is 
sufficient political will to adopt and enforce them. 
Some other problems delineated above concern the market behavior of 
conglomerates. Most of them fall within the usual ambit of conventional 
competition law. The only anomaly is abuse of superior bargaining position, 
which is regulated as unfair trade practices. 
 A.  Direct Regulation of Conglomerates and Their Internal 
Operations 
 1.  Direct Restrictions on the Growth of Conglomerates 
Japan is rather unique in that it imposes direct restrictions on the size of 
conglomerates under its competition law. There are specific provisions that 
target what is known as excessive concentration of economic power. Article 
9(1) of the Anti-Monopoly Act (AMA) states that “[n]o company may be 
established that would cause an excessive concentration of economic power 
due to share holding (including equity interest; the same applies hereinafter) 
in other companies in Japan . . . .”189 Article 9(3) proceeds to define an 
excessive concentration of economic power as follows: 
the overall business scale of a company, its subsidiary companies, and 
other domestic companies whose business activities it controls 
through shareholding, is extremely large across a considerable number 
of business fields; that a company, its subsidiary companies, and other 
domestic companies it controls have a great amount of power to 
influence other enterprises through transactions with their funds; or 
that a company, its subsidiary companies, and other domestic 
companies it controls occupy influential positions in a considerable 
number of interrelated fields of business; and that any of these factors 
have a large effect on the national economy and impede fair and free 
competition from moving forward.190 
The Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) has issued the Guidelines 
 
 188 Jeong-Pyo Choi & Dennis Patterson, Conglomerate Regulation and Aggregate Concentration in 
Korea: An Empirical Analysis, 12 J. OF ASIA PACIFIC ECON. 250, 259–68 (2007) (arguing that the various 
measures adopted in the MRFTA have had minimal impact on aggregate concentration in South Korea). 
 189 Antimonopoly Act, Act No. 54 of 1947, art. 9(1), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/ 
amended_ama09 (Japan). 
 190 Id. art. 9(3). 
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Concerning Companies which Constitute an Excessive Concentration of 
Economic Power to provide a more precise definition of excessive 
concentration of economic power. According to these Guidelines, excessive 
concentration of economic power refers to three scenarios: (1) a corporate 
group which has “business activities whose overall scale is exceptionally 
large and covers a substantial number of principle [sic] fields of business”191; 
(2) a corporate group which wields “a high degree of influence over other 
companies derived from trades involving funds”192; and (3) a corporate group 
which “occupies a substantial position in each of a substantial number of 
principle [sic] fields that are interrelated.”193  These three scenarios would 
only constitute excessive concentration of economic power if the corporate 
group exerts “big influence over the national economy”194 and “obstructs 
enhancement of fair and free competition.”195 
The Guidelines further interpret these three scenarios as respectively 
referring to “[a] company group . . .  of large scale and has large-scale 
enterprises in each of a substantial number of principal fields of business 
[headings omitted]”196; “[a] company which owns both a large-scale 
financial company and a large-scale company except a company engaged 
either in financial business or in a line of business closely related thereto 
[headings omitted]”197; and “[a] company which owns substantial number of 
companies each of which possesses a substantial position over a principal 
field of business, [and] the said fields of business being interrelated but 
different for each company [headings omitted].”198 A company group is of 
large scale if it has total assets of over 15 trillion yen.199 A large-scale 
financial company is one with total assets over 15 trillion yen. A large-scale 
enterprise or company is one with total assets of over 300 billion yen.200 A 
company possesses a substantial position if it accounts for no less than 10% 
of the total sales in the field of business.201 A substantial number refers to 
five or more.202 A principal field of business is “a type of industry which is 
 
 191 Guidelines Concerning Companies Which Constitute an Excessive Concentration of Economic 
Power, 2002, art. 2(1), http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/imonopoly_guidelines.files/ 
Company_Concentration.pdf (Japan). 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. art. 2(2). 
 197 Id. art. 2(3). 
 198 Id. art. 2(4). 
 199 Id. art. 2(2). 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. art. 2(4). 
 202 Id. art. 2(2). 
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included in the three-digit classifications of Japan Standard Industrial 
Classification and in which shipment volume exceeds six hundred billion 
JPY.”203 Lastly, the degree of interrelatedness “shall be examined with 
reference to the degree of actual trade dependency among different fields of 
business and the circumstances of user choice.”204 In particular, fields of 
business are interrelated if they share trade relationships or complement or 
substitute relationships.205 By way of example, the JFTC explains that 
electric power and oil refining are interrelated fields of business, as are 
banking, securities, life insurance, and the credit card industry.206 
The Guidelines seem to adopt a prescriptive, mechanical approach to 
the prohibition. If a corporate group falls within any of the three enumerated 
scenarios, it violates Article 9 of the AMA. The Guidelines do not mandate 
a separate consideration of whether the group wields big influence over the 
national economy and whether the group obstructs the enhancement of fair 
and free competition. Under these Guidelines, the JFTC has little discretion 
over the designation of excessive concentration of economic power.207 It is 
not clear how strictly enforced these highly prescriptive rules on excessive 
concentration of economic power are today. 
 2.  Direct Restrictions on Intragroup Transactions 
Most competition laws do not directly regulate cross-subsidization 
within conglomerates as such. The MRFTA in South Korea, however, does 
impose limitations on the ability of conglomerate companies to give 
assistance to each other, such as in the form of debt guarantees. This was 
believed to be a serious issue as it allowed chaebol companies to be 
excessively leveraged. The first version of the restriction came about in the 
1992 amendment, which restricted affiliate debt “guarantees to 200% of the 
[guaranteeing] subsidiaries’ net assets . . . .”208 In the 1996 amendment, the 
cap was lowered to 100% of the guaranteeing subsidiary’s net assets.209 
 
 203 Id. art. 2(4). 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. List 2. 
 207 Toshiaki Takigawa, Competition law and policy of Japan, 54 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 435, 497 
(2009). The provisions regulating economic concentration were introduced in the original AMA to prevent 
the reemergence of zaibatsu after Japan’s defeat in the Second World War. Id. at 496. However, the issue 
of economic concentration has gradually lost its urgency during the post-War years and the Japanese 
parliament, known as the Diet, and the Japan Fair Trade Commission gradually loosened the scope of 
regulation of economic concentration. For example, the prohibition of pure holding companies, which had 
formed the bedrock of regulation of economic concentration was lifted in the 1997 AMA amendment. Id. 
 208 Kyu Uck Lee, Economic Development and Competition Policy in Korea, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 67, 70 (2002). 
 209 Id.  
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Finally, in the 1998 amendment, which remains effective to this day in the 
form of Article 10-2, all kinds of intragroup debt guarantees by affiliated 
companies are prohibited altogether.210 It was said that prior to the 
introduction of this restriction, “chaebols had easy access to banks because 
the chaebol subsidiaries would have other affiliates guarantee the chaebols’ 
debts under the collateral-based loan system—it is very difficult in Korea to 
obtain credit without collateral—thus disproportionately favoring the 
chaebols and fueling their rapid expansion.”211 Therefore, aside from 
preventing cross-subsidization within conglomerates, this provision also 
helps to correct the distortions in the domestic financial markets resulting 
from the oversized presence of conglomerates. 
Somewhat related to the issue of intragroup assistance within a 
conglomerate is cross-shareholding among conglomerate companies. 
Although it is mainly seen as a corporate governance issue, by injecting 
equity capital into an affiliate, a conglomerate company is indirectly 
subsidizing the affiliate’s operations. Article 9 of the MRFTA provides that 
a “company belonging to [a designated business] group . . . shall not acquire 
or own stocks of an affiliated company which . . . owns [that first company’s] 
stock.”212 Affiliated companies are defined in Article 2 as companies 
belonging to the same designated business group.213 
 B.  Regulation of Market Behavior 
 1.  Mutual Interdependence 
Mutual interdependence essentially results in or facilitates three types 
of harmful situations: express collusion, tacit collusion, and mutual 
forbearance in competitive effort. For express collusion, the solution is 
relatively straightforward. Cartels are uniformly condemned under 
competition laws across the globe. What needs to be done is that competition 
authorities need to be vigilant in markets in which the likelihood of collusion 
is augmented by mutual interdependence. For tacit collusion, given that it is 
generally legal, there is probably not much that competition law can do to 
directly tackle the problem. The same applies to mutual forbearance. If the 
leverage comes from a sales relationship or supply of important input, 
presumably, the competition authority can attempt to remove the leverage by 
 
 210 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Act No. 3320,1980, arts. 10–2, (S. Kor.), translated in 
Korea Fair Trade Commission online database, http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command= 
getList&type_cd=62&pageId=0401. 
 211 Lee, supra note 208, at 70.  
 212 Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, art. 9. 
 213 Id. art. 2.  
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ordering the severance of the sales or supply relationship. This, however, 
would amount to an excessive intrusion of commercial freedom as a currently 
beneficial business relationship is being sacrificed for possible reduction in 
competitive effort. Unless the competition authority can prove actual and 
palpable reduction in competitive effort, such a prohibition would be ill-
justified. And if the leverage comes from relative weakness in particular 
markets, there would be nothing that the competition authority can do to 
remedy that. It would seem that for cases of tacit collusion and mutual 
forbearance, the greatest hope is to rely on merger review to prevent the 
emergence of situations of mutual interdependence in the first place. This 
will be discussed in greater detail in the merger review part. 
 2.  Parallel Exclusion 
As mentioned earlier, parallel exclusion has not been expressly 
recognized as conduct actionable under competition law in the United States 
or elsewhere. However, as Hemphill and Wu suggest, it is possible to 
accommodate it under existing U.S. antitrust doctrines such as shared 
monopoly or conspiracy to monopolize under § 2 of the Sherman Act, or the 
aggregation doctrine under § 1.214 They also suggest invoking § 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission and prosecuting parallel exclusion as an unfair 
method of competition.215 Likewise, under EU competition law, it may be 
possible to fit parallel exclusion under the doctrine of collective dominance 
under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).216 An alternative would be to pursue it under Article 101 of the 
TFEU, which, unlike § 1 of the Sherman Act, does not require an 
agreement.217 A concerted practice will also sustain an infringement of 
Article 101. The notion of concerted practice has been used to tackle parallel 
conduct in oligopolistic markets in the past,218 and it is possible it can be used 
to cover parallel exclusion. Therefore, on both sides of the Atlantic, there are 
possibilities to use competition law to tackle parallel exclusion. 
 3.  Predatory Pricing 
Competition law, of course, regulates predatory pricing. Under U.S. 
antitrust law, a plaintiff, in order to prevail in a predatory pricing claim, must 
show that the defendant monopolist has priced its product below a certain 
 
 214 Hemphill & Wu, supra note 128, at 1236–43, 1245–48. 
 215 Id. at 1243–45. 
 216 Id. at 1239 n.237. 
 217 WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 162, at 103–120. 
 218 Id. at 603–05. 
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measure of cost and there is a dangerous probability of recoupment of the 
loss sustained during the predation period.219 Under EU competition law, 
there is no need to prove recoupment. Instead, the applicable rule changes 
according to the level of the price. If the price is above average total cost, 
then the price cutting is presumptively legal.220 If the price is below average 
variable cost, there is a rebuttable presumption that it has committed 
predatory pricing.221 If the price is between average total cost and average 
variable cost, the defendant would be guilty of predation if the price cutting 
is part of a plan to eliminate a competitor.222 While the consensus in the 
United States seems to be that the requirement of a showing of probable 
recoupment is sound, Leslie has recently argued against this requirement, 
more in line with EU law.223 This article will not attempt to resolve this 
highly intricate debate. Suffice it to say for now that if below-cost price 
cutting by conglomerate companies seems frequent enough in a particular 
jurisdiction, there may be a good argument for abolishing the recoupment 
requirement, which is widely believed to have rendered the predatory pricing 
claim unwinnable under U.S. law.224 This is especially true when there is 
evidence that the target has impaired access to the capital market, which 
means it has reduced ability to withstand predation, which in turn means that 
there is a smaller loss for the predator to recoup. 
If the requirement is to be kept, then it needs to be adjusted to allow for 
a showing of multimarket recoupment. Not allowing for this would overstate 
the difficulty of recoupment for conglomerate companies and result in false 
negatives. However, one needs to be mindful of the complexity of this proof 
of multimarket recoupment. The recoupment that takes place in other 
markets will not be in the form of a price increase after a rival has exited the 
market. It will be the premium that the conglomerate can charge in light of 
deterred market entry. This would require the courts to identify who the likely 
entrants are and estimate how far the price would have dropped if they had 
entered. And this would have to be done for multiple markets. This would 
probably be beyond the capability of most courts. 
 
 219 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 210 (1993).   
 220 See Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1991 E.C.R. I-3359, ¶ 
91.  
 221 See id. ¶ 72. 
 222 Id. ¶ 71. 
 223 Christopher R. Leslie, Predatory Pricing and Recoupment, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1695, 1698–1700 
(2013). 
 224 Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (2005). 
CHENG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017  6:21 PM 
Conglomerate Dominance in Small and Emerging Economies 
37:35 (2017) 
81 
 4.  Tying 
Competition law is fully equipped to handle tying, which is within the 
purview of both U.S. antitrust law and EU competition law. In fact, tying is 
one of the few nonhorizontal conduct towards which both sides of the 
Atlantic share a similarly hostile attitude.225 The leading case under U.S. 
antitrust law is Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde.226 In this 
case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the qualified per se rule for tying, under 
which the plaintiff, in order to prevail, must prove: (1) there are two distinct 
products, (2) customers are coerced to purchase the two products together, 
(3) the defendant possesses market power in the tying product market, and 
(4) a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product is affected.227 
In Europe, the case law by and large imposes the same requirements on a 
tying or bundling claim.228 One extra twist under EU law is that the defendant 
is allowed to offer an objective justification for the tie, which, if accepted, 
would exonerate the defendant.229 Under the qualified per se rule in the 
United States, no procompetitive justifications will be accepted. 
 5.  Abuse of Superior Bargaining Position 
As mentioned earlier, abuse of superior bargaining position is not within 
the purview of conventional competition law. In both Japan and Korea it is 
regulated as an unfair trade practice. In both jurisdictions, there is a set of 
detailed guidelines and a body of decisional practice and case law that 
explain the application of the provision. The KFTC Guidelines provide very 
detailed guidance on how the provision is applied.230 A full explanation of 
the complex analytical framework is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice 
it to note that under the provision, it is necessary both to prove a superior 
bargaining position and the existence of an abuse, which should fall within 
one of the five categories stipulated in the MRFTA. 
The MRFTA provides that a superior bargaining position is to be 
established in light of factors such as the “ease of securing a substitute party 
for trade, level of income dependency in the relationship, control or 
 
 225 Perhaps one minor difference is that tying is almost exclusively treated as an abuse of dominance 
under EU law, whereas it could be prosecuted under both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
which usually means that Section 1 is invoked by virtue of its lower market power requirement. 
 226 466 U.S. 2 (1984).  
 227 Id. 
 228 WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 162, at 732–36. 
 229 Id. at 736. 
 230 Korea Fair Trade Commission, Guidelines for Assessment of Unfair Trade Practices, translated in 
Korea Fair Trade Commission online database, http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command= 
getList&type_cd=62&pageId=0401 [hereinafter KFTC Guidelines]. 
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supervision involved, and characteristics of goods or services traded.”231 The 
Guidelines further state that the fact that the counterparty had no choice but 
to accept the abusive conduct, such as forced purchase demand, shows that 
the undertaking has a superior bargaining position. Ease of securing a 
substitute party for trade refers to “whether or not it is possible to find another 
undertaking to trade with at a low transaction cost.”232 The reference to low 
transaction cost suggests that the standard is not high. What needs to be 
proved is not absolute impossibility, but only that a replacement cannot be 
found without incurring high transaction costs. The replacement will only be 
deemed to be adequate if it does not result in reduction in trading volume or 
does not present difficulties for the counterparty to recover its investments.233 
In other words, the Guidelines make it quite easy to demonstrate a lack of 
choice.234 In KFTC’s decisional practices, it seems that the KFTC 
emphasizes the following factors: the market in which the parties operate, the 
gap between the parties’ business capacities and their scope of business 
activities, and the characteristics of the product or service.235 Lastly, the 
KFTC’s decisional practice suggests that the KFTC pays much attention to 
the defendant’s market power in the market to which the contract pertains. 
The KFTC usually begins each decision with a very detailed analysis of the 
relevant market and proceeds to enumerate the party’s market share. 
Given the number of different conduct enumerated in the MRFTA, this 
article will not examine the legal treatment of each type of abuses. Forced 
purchase will be used as an example for illustration. The KFTC Guidelines 
defines forced purchase as “an undertaking forcing its trading counter[party] 
to purchase goods or services even though the counterparty has no intention 
of doing so.”236 The purchase must be made under coercion, which can be 
proved by the existence of penalty for failure to purchase and other objective 
facts suggesting that the counterparty was forced to make the purchase. The 
Guidelines emphasize that the primary consideration in determining the 
legality of forced purchase, like other prohibited abuses, is whether it 
 
 231 Id. § II.6.A.(2)(B). Similar criteria are used in other jurisdictions such as France. Bakhoum, supra 
note 163, at 5–6.   
 232 KFTC Guidelines, supra note 230, § II.6.A.(2)(B). 
 233 Id. 
 234 This is similar to the situation in Italy where an undertaking is required to demonstrate that it is 
unable to substitute its production or its contractual counterparty without incurring unreasonable costs. 
See Valeria Falce, The Italian Regulation against the abuse of economic dependence, in ABUSE OF 
DOMINANCE IN COMPETITION LAW (Paul Nihoul & Iwakazu Takahashi eds., forthcoming) (on file with 
author). However, this is already a more stringent standard than France, where an economic dependent 
situation can be said to exist if a contractual party cannot replace its counterparty on identical terms. 
Bakhoum, supra note 163, at 10. 
 235 Cheng & Gal, supra note 164, at 305. 
 236 KFTC Guidelines, supra note 230, § II.6.A.(1)(A). 
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“violates principles of fairness in trade.” Unfairness of the forced purchase 
can be established in light of factors such as “the objective of the conduct, 
likelihood of anticipation by the counterparty, . . . ordinary course of trade in 
the industry, damage [] caused to the counterparty as a result of the forced 
purchase, and relevant laws.”237 On the likelihood of anticipation, the 
Guidelines explain that if the forced purchase was “clearly predictable or if 
the purchase is specified in the contract from the beginning, such forced 
purchase shall not be considered unfair.”238 This suggests that at least with 
respect to forced purchase, the abuse of superior bargaining position only 
applies to ex post contractual revisions, which substantially narrows its 
scope. 
Before concluding this discussion about abuse of superior bargaining 
position, it should be noted that regulating unilateral exploitative practices 
by a nondominant firm is highly controversial within competition law. 
Wagner-von Papp argues that these provisions upset the careful balance that 
has been struck to avoid false positives in the abuse of dominance 
provisions.239 Another recurrent problem in this area is the difficulty in 
coming up with a rigorous definition of superior bargaining position. 
Therefore, while it may be justified to extend the provisions to conglomerates 
if a particular jurisdiction already has these provisions in place, it may not be 
wise to adopt them solely for the purpose of regulating exploitative practices 
by conglomerate companies. These provisions will be applied to many 
scenarios beyond conglomerates that a jurisdiction may not want to regulate. 
 6.  Entry Deterrence/Loss of Potential Competition 
Entry deterrence on its own is not a competition law violation. It is only 
the outcome or effect of particular conduct. How it is treated under 
competition law depends on how it is achieved. If it is achieved by means of 
parallel exclusion or the reputational effect of predation, it would be evidence 
that the alleged conduct is exclusionary and therefore illegal. However, if the 
entry deterrent effect is the result of the vastness of a conglomerate and the 
need to replicate its business connections, as argued by Ayal, there would be 
no remedy under competition law short of making being a conglomerate itself 
a violation, which no jurisdiction does. An alternative would be measures to 
limit the growth and size of conglomerates, which Korea and Japan have 
adopted. This stops short of making being a conglomerate itself a violation, 
but restricts conglomerates from becoming too big, hence reducing the 
 
 237 Id. § II.6.A.(2)(B). 
 238 Id. 
 239 Wagner-von Papp, supra note 163, at 60.  
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probability that they would exert the undesired entry deterrent effect. 
Meanwhile, regulating conglomerate mergers for potential competition 
concerns is widely accepted in U.S. antitrust law.240 A detailed discussion 
about this will be reserved for the merger review part. 
 7.  Interlocking Directorate 
Interlocking directorate is regulating by § 8 of the Clayton Act. It 
provides that “[n]o person shall, at the same time, serve as a director or 
officer of any two corporations . . . that are . . . by virtue of their business and 
location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by 
agreements between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust 
laws.”241 The statute then provides a number of minor exemptions for small 
corporations and insignificant competitive overlap. Section 8 expects the 
worst of an interlocking directorate in that it assumes the common director 
to bring about the most anticompetitive consequence. The test for legality is 
whether a competition-eliminating agreement between the two competitors 
would be illegal under any of the antitrust laws. Given that price fixing cartel 
is the most harmful conduct between two competitors,  § 8 essentially means 
that if a price fixing agreement between two firms would be illegal, the 
interlocking directorate would be illegal even though an exclusive dealing 
agreement or a joint venture between the two firms would be upheld.242 
Interlocking directorate between two vertically related firms is generally 
legal under the statute since the firms are not competitors.243 It is fair to say 
that interlocking directorate has not been an enforcement priority of the two 
U.S. Agencies. However, in 2009, the Federal Trade Commission did launch 
a high-profile investigation of interlocking directorate between Google and 
Apple.244 The investigation caused the resignation of Eric Schmidt, the then-
chief executive officer of Google, from Apple’s board.245 
 
 240 On the contrary, the EU does not seem to put much focus on potential competition as a competitive 
concern for conglomerate mergers. There is no mention of loss of potential competition in the 
conglomerate merger section of the EU Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.  
 241 Clayton Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (2012). 
 242 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW AND COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE § 12.11 (4th ed. 2011).  
 243 Id. Common remedies of interlocking directorate include elimination of the interlock and 
prohibitions of future interlock. Damages are theoretically available, but have yet to be awarded to private 
parties. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 430 (6th ed. 2007). 
 244 Miguel Helft & Brad Stone, Board Ties at Apple and Google Are Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES (May 
4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/technology/companies/05apple.html?_r=0.  
 245 David Goldman, Google CEO Schmidt leaves Apple board, CNN MONEY (Aug. 3, 2009, 9:39 
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/03/technology/schmidt_google_apple_board/.   
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 8.  Merger Review 
Merger review can be an effective means to control the conglomerate 
problem by preventing their emergence in the first place or by preventing 
them from continuing to grow (at least for growth by acquisition). Both the 
United States and the EU regulate conglomerate mergers (in the case of the 
United States, it at least used to). However, the way these mergers are 
regulated in these two jurisdictions would not address the concerns about 
conglomerates highlighted in this article. In the United States, regulation of 
conglomerate mergers was focused on either the loss of potential competition 
or increased risks of exclusionary practices, such as reciprocity, tying, or 
predatory pricing.246 Likewise, in the EU, the main focus in regulating 
conglomerate mergers is on potential foreclosure effects through tying 
practices. The regulatory focus is not on sheer size as such, but on potential 
risks of impairment of competition or anticompetitive conduct. Therefore, 
while merger review will help to tackle some of the specific concerns about 
conglomerates, such as elimination of potential competition, tying, or 
predatory pricing, it will not address the root of the problem itself. 
Merger review can be used to ensure that effective potential competition 
is preserved. According to the 1984 Guidelines, there are two potential 
competition theories: perceived potential competition and actual potential 
competition. Under the perceived potential competition theory, 
[b]y eliminating a significant present competitive threat that 
constrains the behavior of the firms already in the market, the merger 
could result in an immediate deterioration in market performance. . . . 
If the acquiring firm had unique advantages in entering the market, the 
firms in the market might be able to set a new and higher price after 
the threat of entry by the acquiring firm was eliminated by the 
merger.247 
Under the actual potential competition theory, 
[b]y eliminating the possibility of entry by the acquiring firm in a more 
procompetitive manner, the merger could result in a lost opportunity 
for improvement in market performance resulting from the addition of 
a significant competitor. The more procompetitive alternatives 
include both new entry and entry through a ‘toehold’ acquisition of a 
present small competitor.248 
 
 246 HOVENKAMP, supra note 242, § 13.3. Professor Hovenkamp, however, notes that these risks are 
more often imagined than real. 
 247 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 176, § 4.111.  
 248 Id. § 4.112. 
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According to the Guidelines, when evaluating potential competition 
concerns, the Department of Justice will focus on a number of factors, 
including: (1) market concentration, (2) conditions of entry, (3) the acquiring 
firm’s entry advantage, and (4) the market share of the acquired firm.249 
In the Marine Bancorporation case, the Supreme Court defined the 
perceived potential competition doctrine as consisting of the following three 
elements: 
if the target market is substantially concentrated, if the acquiring firm 
has the characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to render 
it a perceived potential de novo entrant, and if the acquiring firm’s 
premerger presence on the fringe of the target market in fact tempered 
oligopolistic behavior on the part of existing participants in that 
market.250 
The Court in that case expressly reserved the issue of whether actual potential 
competition is a recognized doctrine under U.S. merger review law.251 
Merger review can also be used to prevent situations of mutual 
forbearance from arising in the first place. While the idea is simple in theory, 
the difficulty lies in determining when mutual interdependence is likely to 
arise. It cannot be the rule that mergers are prohibited whenever a 
conglomerate enters by acquisition a market in which other conglomerates 
operate, when these conglomerates also compete in another market. Cases in 
which the leverage for mutual forbearance is an important sales or supply 
relationship are relatively easier. The competition authority can simply 
prohibit a conglomerate from acquiring a firm that is an important supplier 
or customer of another conglomerate. Cases in which the leverage for mutual 
forbearance is relative weakness in a market present more difficulties. The 
authority cannot prohibit a merger simply because the target is weak and 
would become a source of leverage for rivals. However, Areeda and Turner 
have noted that this kind of acquisition is highly unlikely.252 
Areeda and Turner have proposed an analytical framework to determine 
when intervention is justified in cases in which mutual interdependence 
increases the likelihood of express or tacit collusion. They stipulate three 
 
 249 Id. §§ 4.131–4.134.  
 250 418 U.S. at 624–25. 
 251 Id. at 625. 
 252 Phillip Areeda & Donald Turner, Conglomerate Mergers: Extended Interdependence and Effects 
on Interindustry Competition as Grounds for Condemnation, 127 U. PENN L. REV. 1082, 1089 (1979) (“A 
firm with a strong position in one market would have no incentive to acquire a vulnerable firm in a second 
market if the principal effect of that acquisition were to reduce its perceived ability to make profit-
maximizing moves in the first market. Nor is there any reason for a firm vulnerable in one market to 
acquire a strong firm in a second market if the vulnerability reduced its felt ability to exploit the strong 
firm’s position.”). 
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necessary conditions for intervention: (1) “[t]he merged firm and at least one 
rival must confront each other in two markets, each of which is somewhat 
oligopolistic in performance but not rigidly so,”253 (2) “[t]he merged firm and 
at least one other two-market firm must both be significant in both markets, 
and both markets must be relatively important to both firms,”254 and (3) “[t]o 
be deterred from a price cut in one market a firm must be subject to sanctions 
in the second market.”255 The condition for a somewhat but not rigidly 
oligopolistic market is due to the fact that if the market is already rigidly 
oligopolistic, competition probably cannot get much worse.256 There is not 
much to worry about. Significance is relevant because if the two firms are 
not significant forces in the market, their actions will not affect overall 
market performance.257 Importance is relevant because if the market is not 
important to the two firms, they will not be affected by losses in it.258 
Following Bernheim and Whinston’s theory about transfer of surplus 
enforcement power, the competition authority would also want to pay 
attention to whether (1) one market is rapidly growing and the other is slow-
growing, (2) one market is one in which actions are directly observable and 
immediately punishable and the other one in which there are substantial 
detection and punishment lags, or (3) one market has high demand and the 
other has low demand. These pairings of markets would raise the likelihood 
and severity of sanction. 
Despite the limited effectiveness of merger review in tackling the 
conglomerate problem, it is correct after all that it is only used to target 
specific competitive concerns or conduct that may arise from a merger, such 
as mutual interdependence, loss of potential competition, or increased risks 
for exclusionary conduct, as opposed to being used to regulate size. Any 
attempt to use merger review to prevent conglomerates from emerging in the 
first place or growing would be inevitably arbitrary. Questions such as what 
qualifies as a conglomerate, what should be the limit of size, how should size 
be measured, etc. will necessitate some arbitrary line drawing. Any rules that 
can be formulated will also be highly complex and prescriptive, as is 
evidenced by the Japanese rules on excessive concentration of economic 
power. Finally, to the extent that a conglomerate is family-owned, which 
many conglomerates in emerging economies are, restrictions on the growth 
of conglomerates can be circumvented through some family shareholding 
trusts or other mechanisms. They are unlikely to be effective. 
 
 253 Id. at 1084. 
 254 Id. at 1085. 
 255 Id. at 1086. 
 256 Id. at 1085. 
 257 Id. at 1086. 
 258 Id.  
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 VI.  THE CASE OF HONG KONG 
 A.  Overview of Competition Law in Hong Kong 
Hong Kong was one of the last developed economies to adopt a cross-
sector competition law. Prior to 2012, the government had espoused a 
sectoral approach to competition law, having in place competition law 
provisions in the sector-specific regulations for the telecom and broadcasting 
sectors. This is despite the fact that there had been vocal public demand for 
a cross-sector competition law since the 1990s, when the Consumer Council, 
a statutory consumer advocacy body, recommended that Hong Kong adopt 
one. One of the main reasons for the public demand for competition law, 
contrary to the conventional conception of the objective of competition law, 
is not to obtain greater protection for consumer welfare. It is the long held 
perception that the local economy is dominated by conglomerates, most of 
which are family-owned and heavily involved in property development.259 
One study concludes that the corporate assets held by the fifteen largest 
families in Hong Kong accounted for 84.2% of GDP, and that the five largest 
corporate groups controlled 32.1% of the market capitalization in Hong Kong 
in 1996.260 
The conglomerates have been accused of a variety of conduct, such as 
collusion, tying, refusal to deal, predatory pricing, and exploitative practices 
against suppliers. They have also been accused of squeezing out SMEs and 
excessive pricing, especially in the property management sector. There are 
high public expectations that the newly enacted Competition Ordinance will 
address the dominance of conglomerates in Hong Kong. While some of the 
alleged conduct clearly falls within the purview of competition law, others 
can present difficulty. For instance, the exploitative practices against 
suppliers are generally tackled under the rubric of unfair trade practices, 
which the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance does not regulate, in other 
jurisdictions. Even though tying is clearly one of the prohibited business 
practices under competition law, it is mostly regulated as an abuse of 
dominance. The problem is that in Hong Kong, the alleged perpetrators of 
tying usually do not command a dominant position in their relevant markets. 
 
 259 Due to the lack of inhabitable land in the city, property development is one of the most important 
sectors of the economy. See Hong Kong Monetary Authority, The Property Market and the Macro-
Economy, QUARTERLY BULLETIN 05/2001, 1 (2001), http://www.hkma.gov.hk/media/eng/publication-
and-research/quarterly-bulletin/qb200105/fa02.pdf.  
 260 Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership and Control 
in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 108 (2000). 
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 B.  An Overview of Conglomerate Dominance in Hong Kong 
As mentioned earlier, some commentators have drawn a distinction 
between conglomerates and corporate groups. In Hong Kong, no such 
distinction is drawn. A conglomerate refers to a business group which 
operates in multiple sectors of the economy through its subsidiaries. Most of 
the conglomerates in Hong Kong are family-owned, especially those that 
were established by a local founder and not descended from the British 
trading houses from the colonial times. Some of the more prominent 
conglomerates in Hong Kong include the Cheung Kong Group, Sun Hung 
Kai, Henderson Land, the New World Group, Swire Pacific, and Jardine 
Matheson. In particular, the owner of the Cheung Kong Group, Li Ka Shing, 
is the richest man in Asia and the seventeenth richest man in the world, 
according to Forbes.261 Lee Shau Kee, the owner of Henderson Land, is the 
twenty-seventh richest man in the world.262 The fact that two men from a 
place as small as Hong Kong can be ranked among the top thirty richest men 
in the world underscores the degree of concentration of wealth in the city. 
Studies have produced a range of results on aggregate concentration in 
Hong Kong. Claessens and his coauthors find that the ten largest families in 
Hong Kong controlled about a third of the corporate sector and that the five 
largest family groups controlled 32.1% of the market capitalization in Hong 
Kong.263 Masulis and his coauthors find slightly lower figures. They report 
that 15.63% of the listed firms in Hong Kong belonged to family groups and 
26.29% of the market capitalization was accounted for by such groups.264 
According to Poon, listed companies controlled by the six leading 
conglomerates accounted for 14.7% of the total market capitalization of the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2010.265 This is after significant dilution of 
the Hong Kong stock market by Mainland companies. Eight years earlier, the 
same companies were responsible for 23.5% of the market capitalization in 
Hong Kong.266 It has also been estimated that the six biggest conglomerates 
in Hong Kong take in at least 23 cents of every dollar spent by the city’s 
residents.267 
The Economist has come up with a slightly different way of measuring 
 
 261 Chase Peterson-Withorn, Forbes Billionaires: Full List of The 500 Richest People in the World 
2015, FORBES (Mar. 2, 2015, 7:00AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chasewithorn/2015/03/02/forbes-
billionaires-full-list-of-the-500-richest-people-in-the-world-2015/. 
 262 Id. 
 263 Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 260, at 83, 108. 
 264 Masulis et al., supra note 22, at 3569.  
 265 ALICE POON, LAND AND THE RULING CLASS IN HONG KONG 23 (2011). 
 266 Id. 
 267 Te-ping Chen, Hong Kong’s Tycoons Under Attack, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2012, 2:59AM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444230504577615212739865968. 
CHENG (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2017  6:21 PM 
Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 37:35 (2017) 
90 
the concentration of aggregate concentration. It publishes what is known as 
the Crony Capitalism Index, which calculates “the total wealth of those of 
the world’s billionaires who are active mainly in rent-heavy industries,” 
which refer to industries that are more susceptible to rent-seeking, such as 
(1) casinos; (2) coal, palm oil, and timber; (3) defense; (4) commercial and 
investment banking; (5) infrastructure and pipelines; (6) oil, gas, chemicals, 
and other energy; (7) ports and airports; (8) real estate and construction; (9) 
steel, other metals, mining, and commodities; and (10) utilities and telecom 
services.268 Unsurprisingly, Hong Kong came out on top in the Index, with 
close to 80% of the city’s GDP accounted for by billionaires in the so-called 
“crony sectors.” Hong Kong’s percentage is almost four times as high as 
Russia’s, which came out number two in the Index.269 Hong Kong’s 
preponderance in these crony sectors is all the more remarkable because it is 
basically entirely absent in six of the ten enumerated sectors, including 
casinos, coal, defense, infrastructure, oil and gas, and steel and mining. Hong 
Kong is a major financial center. Therefore, it is not surprising that finance 
accounts for a significant proportion of the GDP. However, it is important to 
bear in mind that the Index does not calculate the percentage of GDP 
accounted for by a particular sector, but by the total wealth of billionaires 
operating in that sector. Most of the major financial institutions in Hong 
Kong are multinational corporations. The owners of these institutions are not 
local billionaires, and hence would not be counted towards the Index. What 
then accounts for the extraordinary high percentage of local GDP attributed 
to the crony sectors? The answer lies in the real estate sector. 
The real estate or the property sector has always been one of the most 
important sectors in the local economy, especially since the departure of 
manufacturing for Mainland China in the 1980s. The local economy has been 
inextricably linked to the swings of the property market ever since the 1980s. 
The economy expanded rapidly during the prehandover rally in the real estate 
market from the late-1980s all the way to the Asian Financial Crisis. And the 
economy was in doldrums for years when the property market collapsed 
dramatically during the Asian Financial Crisis. It is no coincidence that 
practically all the major conglomerates in Hong Kong are involved in the 
property sector. Cheung Kong, Sun Hung Kai, and Henderson Land are three 
of the largest property development companies in Hong Kong.270 The other 
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conglomerates such as New World, Jardine Matheson, Swire Pacific, and 
Hong Kong Land also have significant presence in the real estate sector. The 
property sector is especially crucial in Hong Kong as compared to other 
economies largely because of the scarcity of land in the city. The city has an 
area of barely over 1,100 square kilometers, 24% of which consisted of built-
up areas as of 2013.271 76% of the total land area is nonbuilt-up land that is 
scattered across the city in the form of woodland, grassland, wetland, and 
agricultural land.272 According to the government, over 500 square 
kilometers of the city’s land is unsuitable for development as it consists of 
country parks, remote areas, small islands, and steep slopes.273 
What compounds the land scarcity problem is the fact that the 
government is practically the sole supplier of undeveloped land and has long 
adopted a high land price policy.274 Land sales account for a significant part 
of the government’s revenue and therefore the government has had every 
incentive to keep land, and by extension, property prices high. According to 
government data, land sales accounted for between 15% and 20% of the total 
government revenue from 2012 to 2015.275 During the heyday of the property 
market boom, land sales contributed to as much as 30% of the total 
government revenue.276 Stamp duties, which are collected from property 
transactions, contributed another 10% of revenue to the government 
coffers.277 In fact, from April to September 2014, stamp duties accounted for 
more than a quarter of the overall government revenue.278 Therefore, 
property-related revenue sources altogether contribute to more than 30% of 
the government revenue. It is no coincidence that property prices in Hong 
Kong have been some of the highest in the world. According to the 
Telegraph, Hong Kong is the second most expensive place in the world to 
buy residential property, more expensive than New York, London, and 
Tokyo, and just after Monaco, a tiny principality in the south of France.279 
Hong Kong also has the second highest commercial property rental in the 
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world after London.280 
The property development market in Hong Kong is highly concentrated. 
By all accounts, the market has become more concentrated over the last two 
decades. According to a Consumer Council study, 70% of total new private 
housing was supplied by seven developers and 46% by three developers.281 
Moreover, two of the major developers, Sun Hung Kai Properties and 
Henderson Land, allegedly held an enormous land bank.282 By 2010, the top 
four developers accounted for 74% of all new apartments sold and the top 
two developers held 60% of the market.283 By 2014, the top three developers 
supplied 72% of the new apartments sold in Hong Kong.284 In fact, one report 
suggests that the private residential market is as concentrated as the top two 
developers holding 70% of the market.285 It is important to note that market 
share in residential property carries significance beyond the residential 
property market to the market for retail rentals or shopping malls. This is 
because in Hong Kong, residential property development has tended to come 
in large-scale property developments that consist of tens of buildings sitting 
on top of a large shopping mall. Needless to say, the shopping malls thus 
built stay in the hands of the developer. Therefore, a high market share in 
residential property also indirectly gives a developer significant presence in 
the retail rental market, which they use to leverage into the retail sector. 
High market shares on their own of course do not give the top property 
developers market power. What gives these developers substantial market 
power is the high entry barriers to the private residential market. First, the 
market suffers from low contestability. No new player has managed to grab 
a market share of over 5% since 1981.286 It does not help that a number of 
medium-sized developers failed following the Asian Financial Crisis, further 
shielding the top developers from competitive pressure.287 Second, as 
mentioned earlier, a number of the leading developers hold an enormous land 
bank through years of acquisition. Others have acquired substantial land 
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holding through acquisition of utilities companies, whose former plants can 
be converted for residential development.288 
So what is the relevance of the substantial market power of the large 
conglomerate developers in the property development market for the wider 
economy? In Hong Kong, the large conglomerate developers have fulfilled 
the prophecy of Winston Churchill when he declared that land monopoly is 
the mother of all other forms of monopoly,289 and have successfully 
leveraged their market power in the property development market into other 
related markets, such as property management, residential broadband 
services, groceries, pharmacy, and even mobile telephony. As will be 
explained subsequently, such leveraging of market power is particularly 
effective because of the enormous price differential between residential 
property and all these other markets such as groceries and broadband 
services. The large price differential means that consumers pay scant 
attention to these other products or services that are often directly or 
indirectly tied to the purchase of an apartment when making the property 
purchase. Such lack of consumer attention has magnified the market power 
of the conglomerate property developers and has in some sense rendered the 
coercion requirement in a standard tying claim superfluous. The 
conglomerates have thus been able to strengthen their positions in the 
markets for these other products and services through their market power in 
the property development market. 
 C.  Assessment of Advantages and Disadvantages of Conglomerates 
in Hong Kong 
An assessment of the net benefits of conglomerates in Hong Kong is 
important because it informs the policy decision as to what should be done 
about them. If conglomerates redound net benefits to the city, then they 
probably should be tolerated and efforts should be made to contain their 
competition-distorting effects by way of competition law enforcement. If 
conglomerates on balance cause net harm to the economy, as seems to be the 
conclusion in South Korea, then more drastic measures may be needed. 
 1.  How relevant are conglomerate advantages in Hong Kong? 
There is no denying that group membership redounds significant 
benefits to conglomerate companies. Such efficiency benefits may provide 
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strong justifications for the continual existence of conglomerates. However, 
one should note that many of these advantages, such as the provision of 
internal capital and factor markets, overcoming missing institutions, and 
improving access to the international capital markets, are peculiar, or at least 
especially relevant, to emerging economies where legal and financial 
institutions are developing. As noted earlier, many of these advantages fade 
in significance as economies mature and institutions develop. Thus these 
advantages will be of little relevance to conglomerates in Hong Kong, which 
is an advanced economy with high-quality institutions and well-developed 
capital markets.290 According to the World Bank Governance Indicators, 
Hong Kong had a percentile rank of 89.81 for political stability and no 
violence, 98.08 for government effectiveness, 99.52 for regulatory quality, 
93.75 for Rule of Law, and 92.31 for control of corruption in 2014.291 
Overcoming missing institutions thus should be irrelevant for Hong Kong 
companies. Meanwhile, according to the World Bank, Hong Kong’s stock 
market ranked number four in the world behind the United States, China, and 
Japan as measured by market capitalization of domestic listed companies. 
Access to international capital markets and provision of internal capital 
markets are hence not an important concern for Hong Kong companies, at 
least for those big enough to raise capital through public share offerings.292 
The most relevant advantages for conglomerates in Hong Kong, 
therefore, would be economies of scale and scope, risk sharing, and sharing 
of group goodwill. However, it is not entirely clear how relevant the last 
advantage is to conglomerates in Hong Kong. Unlike conglomerates in other 
countries such as South Korea and India, where group companies often 
explicitly incorporate the group name in their corporate identity, it is not 
often easy in Hong Kong to discern that a company belongs to a certain 
conglomerate. Hong Kong conglomerate companies do not seem keen to 
flaunt their group identity. Therefore, the main justifications for 
conglomerates in Hong Kong would be economies of scale and scope and 
risk sharing. In light of the doubts cast by empirical evidence on the ability 
of a conglomerate to reap economies of scale, the efficiency justifications for 
conglomerates in Hong Kong are rather thin. 
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2.  What is the extent of conglomerate harm in Hong Kong? 
Agency costs are a corporate governance problem and not a competition 
law problem, even though poor corporate governance may have implications 
on the competitive behavior of firms. Therefore, if agency costs are deemed 
to be a serious problem in Hong Kong, the solution should be found in 
corporate law and not competition law. In any case, empirical evidence seems 
to suggest that agency costs are not a serious issue. 
Crowding out of SMEs and entrepreneurs has been observed in Hong 
Kong. It is widely acknowledged that the conglomerates have squeezed out 
SMEs in some sectors, such as groceries, as mom-and-pop stores have met 
their demise one after another.293 While it may not be entirely attributable to 
the presence of the conglomerates, studies have suggested that Hong Kong 
has lost much of its entrepreneurship over the years and now has a much 
lower level of entrepreneurship than the global average.294 A related reason 
for the increasing difficulty of entrepreneurship is the high rental costs. The 
high rental costs are partly attributable to the high land price policy of the 
government and partly attributable to the market power of the conglomerate 
property developers. Many small businesses are priced out of the market by 
the high rental costs.295 
The Author is unable to locate studies that attempt to measure the 
overall welfare effects of conglomerates on the Hong Kong economy or the 
impact of conglomerates on SME access to financial markets. However, it 
has been noted that a lack of financing is the main impediment to potential 
growth and internationalization for SMEs in Hong Kong.296 Most founders 
of SMEs in Hong Kong “start with very limited equity capital and rely more 
on seed capital for new businesses from the founders’ personal savings, 
contributions from family and sometimes friends, and from mortgaging their 
properties.”297 There seem to be no studies on SMEs access to bank 
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financing, which is probably the most important of financing for SMEs, in 
Hong Kong. Meanwhile, according to an IOSCO 2015 report, SMEs in Hong 
Kong have not been successful in raising capital in the capital markets. The 
equity market is marred by asymmetric regulation that disadvantages SMEs 
in getting listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.298 And no Hong Kong 
SMEs have successfully issued debt securities.299 More rigorous studies 
would provide more conclusive evidence. But one can surmise that SMEs in 
Hong Kong do face limited access to capital.300 
Both the design of the political system and anecdotal evidence suggest 
that conglomerates in Hong Kong wield significant political influence. The 
political system in Hong Kong is such that the business sector generally, and 
the conglomerates in particular, are given substantial direct influence. The 
city’s mayor, called the chief executive, is selected by a 1200-member-strong 
Election Committee, which is stacked with representatives from the business 
sector. In fact, one of the most peculiar features of this committee is the 
existence of the corporate vote, whereby certain corporations, including the 
major conglomerates, are entitled to their own votes.301 Corporate entities, 
many of which are conglomerates, were wholly or partly responsible for 
electing 570 of the 1200 seats on the Election Committee in 2011.302 This 
selection system gives the conglomerates considerable leverage over the 
chief executive in a government which is very much executive-led. 
Legislation that pertains to public expenditure, political structure or the 
operation of the Government must be introduced by the administration.303 
The Legislative Council (“LegCo”), Hong Kong’s parliament, is also stacked 
in favor of business interest. There are functional constituencies in LegCo, 
which represent a particular profession, such as lawyers or doctors, or a 
particular industry, such as logistics or finance.304 In other words, there is a 
parliament member for the logistics industry or tourism industry. Many of 
the representatives of the functional constituencies have a business 
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background and are beholden to business interests. Together with its leverage 
over the chief executive, the business community in Hong Kong is very well-
positioned to exercise political influence over government policies. 
There also have been cases of nepotism between government officials 
and the conglomerates that suggest that the latter hold significant influence 
over public policy. Chin-Man Leung, the Secretary for Buildings and Lands 
in 2004, authorized the decision to sell below market price the government’s 
stake in a public-private partnership known as the Hunghom Peninsula 
Project to two conglomerate developers, the New World Group and Sun 
Hung Kai Properties.305 After his retirement, Leung was offered a lucrative 
position in the New World Group.306 Amid public uproar, Leung eventually 
gave up the position.307 An even more high-profile case was the Rafael Hui 
case. Hui was a former Chief Secretary for Administration, which is the 
equivalent of a prime minister in the Hong Kong government. In December 
2014, Hui was found guilty of receiving bribes from one of the owners of 
Sun Hung Kai Properties, Thomas Kwok.308 In fact, conglomerate influence 
on the government goes all the way to the very top. The first Chief Executive 
of Hong Kong after the handover, Chee-Hwa Tung, himself hailed from a 
tycoon shipping family. During his administration, Ka-Shing Li of the 
Cheung Kong Group held a stake in Tung’s company.309 Even if Li did not 
in fact leverage his stake in Tung’s company to influence public policy, the 
appearance of potential influence is enough to cause the public to cast doubt 
on the impartiality of Tung’s administration, especially given his own close 
connections to the conglomerate families. And there are well-documented 
instances of the conglomerate developers exerting direct and public influence 
over government policies. The conglomerate developers, through their trade 
association—the Real Estate Developers’ Association—successfully 
torpedoed the Town Planning Bill, which would have introduced greater 
transparency and accountability in the town planning process through direct 
and public lobbying efforts.310 
D.  Possible Responses to Conglomerate Dominance in Hong Kong 
The foregoing discussion shows that conglomerate dominance is a 
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serious problem in Hong Kong. What should be done about it? How should 
Hong Kong deploy the twin tools of direct regulation of conglomerate size 
and internal operations and competition law enforcement? Applying 
competition law to competition-distorting conduct would be uncontroversial. 
Conglomerates are not being singled out. They are subject to the same 
regulation as everyone else. What is more controversial is whether direct 
regulation should be applied. Answering this question entails a three-step 
inquiry. The first step is whether the particular economy enjoys net benefits 
from the existence and continual growth of conglomerates. If the answer is 
yes, conglomerates should be left alone. If the answer is no, then we may 
ponder what can be done about them. The second step is to come up with 
appropriate measures to tackle conglomerates. An appropriate measure 
would be one that is effective without being unduly intrusive. Third, there 
remains the question of whether any measures that are proposed to be 
adopted would be feasible given the local political climate. Given the 
powerful political influence of conglomerates, there needs to be very strong 
political will to push through these measures and enforce them. 
With respect to Hong Kong, the answer to the last two steps clearly point 
to the negative. Regarding the net benefits of conglomerates, while it seems 
that none of the advantages of conglomerates have particular salience to 
Hong Kong anymore, and therefore probably only a modicum of harm would 
tip the net benefits in the negative, a more rigorous and systematic study 
would be necessary to draw definitive conclusions. Regarding the 
appropriateness of the available regulatory tools, the experiences of Japan 
and South Korea have not been encouraging. The measures that have been 
adopted in these two jurisdictions are highly prescriptive and hence intrusive, 
and yet the consensus seems to be that the chaebols continue to dominate the 
South Korean economy. Unless and until better measures can be crafted 
effectively to restrict the growth of conglomerates, any regulatory decision 
must be made with caution. Lastly, there is an evident lack of political will 
to adopt any measures to directly tackle conglomerates in Hong Kong. 
Despite the widespread dissatisfaction within the public about conglomerate 
dominance, the ethos of positive non-interventionism is so deeply ingrained 
in the governance approach in Hong Kong, and the business community has 
such a stranglehold over the Hong Kong political system, that there is little 
hope that any of these more intrusive measures would ever be adopted. It 
took Hong Kong close to twenty years to adopt something as uncontroversial 
as a general competition law. It would take a major political upheaval for any 
legislative measures to be taken against the conglomerates. 
Having established that Hong Kong should eschew direct regulation of 
the conglomerates, it remains to be seen what can be done under the recently 
adopted Competition Ordinance. The fact that options are available under the 
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competition law in other jurisdictions does not mean that they are suitable for 
or available in Hong Kong. One glaring omission from the Ordinance is 
merger review. Under Section 4 of Schedule 7 of the Ordinance, merger 
review is only applicable to the telecom sector.311 The rest of the economy is 
not subject to merger review, which means companies in those sectors can 
merge to monopoly free from regulatory oversight. What makes matters 
worse is that it is not even possible to challenge a consummated merger under 
the equivalent of Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 4 of 
Schedule 1 of the Ordinance expressly excludes mergers from the purview 
of what are known as the first conduct rule (the equivalent of Section 1) and 
the second conduct rule (the equivalent of Section 2).312 Therefore, concerns 
about the loss of potential competition and facilitation of mutual 
interdependence as a result of a merger cannot be addressed under the 
Ordinance. 
The situation is the same for abuse of a superior bargaining position. 
The Hong Kong Ordinance does not include any provision on unfair trade 
practices, which is the basis for regulating the abuse of a superior bargaining 
position in Japan and South Korea. To the extent the abusive conduct can be 
said to restrict competition and is perpetrated by a firm with a substantial 
degree of market power, it may be possible to pursue it under the second 
conduct rule.313 However, most of these abuses do not directly harm 
competition and therefore probably would not meet the requirements of the 
second conduct rule. In any case, the second conduct rule only applies to 
firms with a substantial degree of market power, which would greatly limit 
the reach of the rule in dealing with abuses of superior bargaining position, 
as a superior bargaining position need not, and in many cases does not, equate 
market power. 
Interlocking directorates seems to be a common problem in Hong Kong. 
The degree of overlap between the boards of the leading conglomerates 
seems to be significant.314 Whether the Competition Ordinance can be 
applied to interlocking directorates is a different matter. Unlike the Clayton 
Act, the Ordinance does not contain a section that directly targets 
interlocking directorates. Therefore, prosecuting interlocking directorates 
would need to be done under the general provisions. The first conduct rule 
applies to agreements that restrict competition.315 The employment contracts 
 
 311 Competition Ordinance, (2012) Cap. 619, Sch. 7, § 4 (H.K.).  
 312 Id. at Sch. 1, § 4. 
 313 Id. at § 21. 
 314 Bryane Michael & Say Goo, Last of the Tai-Pans: Improving the Sustainability of Long-Term 
Financial Flows by Improving Hong Kong’s Corporate Governance, 16 AIIFL WORKING PAPER 31 
(2013). 
 315 Competition Ordinance, supra note 311, at § 21. 
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between the director at issue and his or her two companies would certainly 
count as agreements. Whether these agreements restrict competition would 
depend on whether potential effect would suffice for the purpose of the rule 
or whether actual effect must be proven. If actual restrictive effect is required, 
it is unlikely that the first conduct rule can be successfully applied to 
interlocking directorates. It would essentially require direct proof that the 
director at issue passes on competitively sensitive information between the 
two companies which results in a change of competitive behavior. This 
would be a rather difficult burden to meet. 
As far as mutual interdependence is concerned, if it is expressed in the 
form of express collusion, the first conduct rule will readily apply to it. Even 
though there is currently no case law under the Ordinance, there are no signs 
that the first conduct rule will deviate from the international consensus and 
apply to tacit collusion, and it certainly would not apply to mutual 
forbearance. As mentioned in Part 0, entry deterrence from the sheer size of 
the conglomerate would not be a violation. To the extent deterrence is 
achieved through other anticompetitive conduct such as predatory pricing or 
parallel exclusion, the authority can pursue such conduct directly. 
Parallel exclusion would be a very helpful enforcement tool against 
conglomerates in Hong Kong. There has been anecdotal evidence of conduct 
that is suggestive of parallel exclusion, such as the overbuying of land by 
some of the conglomerate property developers to deprive smaller developers 
of supply and the pursuit of predatory pricing by two leading supermarket 
chains, both of which are conglomerate companies, in response to market 
entry in 1999.316 The question is whether it is possible to fit the theory of 
parallel exclusion into the strictures of the Ordinance. Hemphill and Wu 
suggest a number of possibilities under U.S. antitrust law, such as shared 
monopoly, conspiracy to monopolize, Section 5 of the FTC Act, and the 
aggregation doctrine under Section 1. Unfortunately, none of these would be 
possible under Hong Kong law. There is no doctrine of conspiracy to 
monopolize and shared monopoly under the second conduct rule, which 
explicitly refers to substantial degree of market power by an undertaking. 
Nor is there, at least not yet, an aggregation doctrine under the first conduct 
rule. There is also no equivalent of the unfair methods of competition prong 
under Section 5 of the FTC Act. However, all hope is not lost. One saving 
grace under the second conduct rule is that its market power threshold is 
much lower than the monopoly power required under Section 2. Although 
the precise amount of market power required remains to be determined by 
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the courts, the expectation is that 30% to 40% would suffice.317 Therefore, it 
would be possible for the authority to go after conglomerate companies for 
parallel exclusion one by one under the second conduct rule. 
As discussed earlier, one of the major problems with prosecuting 
conglomerates for predatory pricing is the difficulty in taking into 
consideration the possibility of multimarket recoupment. In reality, it would 
be very difficult to ascertain the quantum of recoupment in markets in which 
the conglomerate company did not raise price, but merely avoided the 
prospect of price cutting by an aggressive but now deterred entrant. 
Thankfully, the Competition Ordinance, as currently interpreted by the Hong 
Kong Competition Commission (HKCC), allows for some flexibility 
regarding recoupment. According to Section 5.7 of the Guidelines issued by 
the HKCC on the second conduct rule, the Commission “may, at its 
discretion, consider the extent to which the predating undertaking is in the 
longer term able to ‘recoup’ its short term losses stemming from the below 
cost pricing.”318 Therefore, at least as interpreted by the HKCC, prospect of 
recoupment is not a necessary component in a predatory pricing claim, unlike 
under U.S. antitrust law. This flexibility would allow the HKCC to consider 
evidence of multimarket recoupment when such evidence is available, but 
would not require the HKCC to reject a predatory pricing claim simply 
because successful recoupment cannot be proved. Whether the Competition 
Tribunal, which adjudicates competition cases brought by the HKCC, will 
adopt the same position remains to be seen. 
There have been many instances of tying reported in the media and in 
regulatory decisions over the years involving the conglomerates. In 
particular, most of the ties have involved the sale of property tied with the 
sale of other ancillary services such as property management services,319 
household broadband services,320 or even retail services such as supermarkets 
and pharmacies.321 With property management services, the modus operandi 
is usually that the property developer would reserve the right to appoint the 
 
 317 Thomas K. Cheng, Ready for Action: Looking Ahead to the Implementation of Hong Kong’s 
Competition Ordinance, 5 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRACTICE 88, 93 (2014). 
 318 H.K. COMPETITION COMM’N, GUIDELINE ON THE SECOND CONDUCT RULE 30 (2015), 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/guidance/second_conduct_rule/files/Guideline_The
_Second_Conduct_Rule_Eng.pdf. 
 319 Ngai Ming Yip, Management Rights in Multi-owned Properties in Hong Kong, in Multi-owned 
Housing: Law, Power and Practice 121 (eds. Sarah Blandy, Ann Depuis & Jennifer Dixon, 2010); Hong 
Kong Legislative Council, Amendments to Motion on “Improving Property Management and Operation 
of Owners’ Corporations” 2 (March 21, 2013), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/counmtg/ 
motion/m_papers/cm0327cb3-452-e.pdf. 
 320 T 261/03, OFFICE OF TELECOMMS. AUTH., COMPLAINTS ABOUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 
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property management company before the property is sold. Most of the 
conglomerate property developers in Hong Kong also own a property 
management company as a subsidiary, and the property manager appointed 
would almost invariably be the affiliate. In other words, the sale of the 
property management service would be tied to the sale of residential 
property. With household broadband services, the famous case was the 
Banyan Garden case, in which the Office of Telecommunications Authority, 
the previous telecom regulator, received a complaint that residents of Banyan 
Garden had no choice but to use the broadband service provided by an 
affiliate of the property developer.322 In this instance, the sale of household 
broadband service was tied to the sale of residential property. With retail 
services, this is particular to one of the conglomerate property developers. It 
has long been observed that the shopping malls of its residential properties 
would only have its own affiliate supermarket, pharmacy, and electronics 
retailer. All of these three markets in Hong Kong are essentially duopolies 
with a number of small fringe competitors. The chief rivals of the 
supermarket, pharmacy, and electronics retailer of this conglomerate are 
almost never seen in its shopping malls. Viewed from a tying perspective, 
retail services in supermarket, pharmacy, and electronics are tied to the sale 
of residential property. 
The HKCC, in its Guidelines on the Second Conduct Rule, essentially 
follows the prevailing U.S. and EU approaches of requiring: (1) two distinct 
products, (2) existence of a tie, meaning consumers are coerced to buy the 
two products together, (3) market power in the tying product market, and (4) 
anticompetitive foreclosure in the tied product market.323 There are, however, 
problems with applying this four-part framework to the tying cases described 
above. First, it is not entirely clear that the property developer at issue has 
sufficient market power in the relevant market. It was mentioned earlier that, 
by some measures, the two leading property developers in Hong Kong have 
around 30% market share each in the firsthand residential property market. 
This may turn out to be insufficient for the market share threshold of the 
second conduct rule. Even if that were sufficient, it is not clear that the 
relevant market should be confined to firsthand residential property or should 
be residential property in general. If the relevant market is the latter, the 
developer’s market share is surely much lower than 30%. And there are good 
arguments that residential property in general should be the relevant market 
as firsthand and secondhand residential properties seem to be reasonable 
substitutes in the eyes of the buyers. Therefore, there is likely to be 
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insufficient market power for the purpose of the second conduct rule. Second, 
at least in the context of retail services, it is not clear that the coercion element 
is present. Consumers are not forced to purchase property and those retail 
services from the same conglomerate. They are free to go elsewhere for their 
grocery shopping, personal care products, or electronics. Consumers tend to 
visit those stores in their estate’s shopping mall because of proximity. 
All this may mean that the instances of tying enumerated above may be 
beyond the reach of the second conduct rule. However, this Author believes 
that when the value of the tying product and the value of the tied product 
differ so drastically—USD $2 million for a residential property versus USD 
$30 a month for household broadband service or USD $50 for groceries—
the requirement for market power in the tying product and the coercion 
requirement become meaningless. The reason for requiring that the seller 
have market power in the tying product market is to ensure that consumers 
are truly forced by a lack of reasonable substitutes in the tying product market 
to purchase the tied product. Otherwise, the tie would inflict no harm as 
consumers are free to go elsewhere. When the value of tying product dwarves 
that of the tied product, consumers are simply not going to take the tied 
product into account when purchasing the tying product, and they are simply 
not going to switch to another tying product in reaction to the tie even though 
alternatives are available. In the eyes of the consumers, the tied product is 
simply too insignificant in the purchase decision for the tying product. 
This does not, however, mean that consumers do not care about the lack 
of choice in household broadband service or property management service 
once they have purchased the residential property, as evidenced by the 
consumer complaints that arise after the fact. The fact that consumers were 
not mindful of the deprivation of choice when they purchased the residential 
property does not mean that they do not value the choice. It also does not 
mean that there is no foreclosure effect on competing household broadband 
service or property management service providers. The main reason that 
competition law prohibits tying is not because it limits consumer choice, but 
because it forecloses the tied product market.324 Given the substantial market 
share of this property developer (even though it falls short of what it required 
for the second conduct rule), there is going to be significant foreclosure 
effect. Competing grocers are effectively foreclosed from 20% to 30% of the 
market because they are not allowed to rent in shopping malls owned by that 
developer.325 The foreclosure effect is particularly significant for property 
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management services, as it seems that many of the property developers in 
Hong Kong have the same practice. There is a serious concern of parallel 
exclusion of rival unaffiliated property management service companies. 
Therefore, the proposed rule is when there is a huge discrepancy between the 
value of the tying product and that of the tied product, the market power 
requirement for the tying product and the coercion requirement should be 
relaxed. 
Against the high public expectations for the recently enacted 
Competition Ordinance, it seems that it would not be able to tackle the root 
of the problem, which is the domination of the local economy by 
conglomerates. In order to do that, Hong Kong may need to consider some 
more drastic measures, such as what Japan and Korea have in place in their 
competition laws, which have largely proven to be ineffective and highly 
intrusive. There is also an absence of the requisite political will to enact such 
measures. In the end, the citizenry of Hong Kong may have to accept that 
conglomerate dominance is here to stay and the most that competition law 
can do is to limit the extent of the damage wrought by the conglomerate’s 
anticompetitive conduct. This is not to say that improvements cannot be 
made to the current Competition Ordinance. The most obvious one would be 
to extent merger review beyond the telecom sector to the rest of the economy. 
That would allow the HKCC to safeguard against the loss of potential 
competition or the creation of mutual interdependence in conglomerate 
merger cases. One can also consider the introduction of a provision directly 
regulating interlocking directorate and the expansion of the second conduct 
rule to cover parallel exclusion scenarios. And if there is a desire to tackle of 
exploitative practices, the second conduct rule can be revised to apply to 
exploitative practices as well as exclusionary practices. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The goal of this article is to highlight a competition problem that has 
been long overlooked by the two leading competition law jurisdictions in the 
world, the United States and the EU. It presents a two-step framework for 
determining the correct response to conglomerate dominance in an economy. 
Given the size of these two continental-scale economies, it is no surprise that 
no conglomerates dominate these economies. The same cannot be said about 
small economies and emerging economies, which tend to be less dynamic 
and more prone to conglomeration. Once conglomerates have emerged and 
solidified their positions, there are two options available: direct regulation of 
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their size and internal operations or competition law enforcement against 
their anticompetitive conduct. The former, which requires an assessment of 
net benefits of conglomerates, can be said to be a direct challenge to the 
notion of conglomerates. It is often clumsy and ineffective, not to mention 
highly intrusive. It is of questionable merit. Therefore, if it is believed that 
mere regulation of their anticompetitive conduct is insufficient, the first line 
of defense against conglomerates would seem to be to prevent them from 
emerging in the first place, i.e., through merger review. However, the kind of 
conglomerate merger review existing under U.S. and EU law, which focuses 
on elimination of potential competition and foreclosure effects through tying 
and reciprocity, would not serve this purpose. To prevent conglomerates 
from becoming too big that they acquire excessive economic power and 
political influence, regulation based on size would be necessary. Merger 
review based on size alone, however, would be fraught with difficulty. 
The alternative would be to accept that, just like with abuse of 
dominance or monopolization—competition law does not regulate 
dominance or monopoly power, but only the abuse of it—it should equally 
leave conglomerates and their economic power alone and only regulate 
instances where there is anticompetitive conduct. Yet there is an important 
difference between monopoly power and conglomerate economic power. 
One reason that we do not directly regulate monopoly power is the belief that 
if left to market forces, monopoly power will eventually be eroded away by 
new entrants or new products. Monopoly power does not last. In contrast, 
experience tends to show that conglomerates endure and they are not eroded 
away by new entrants or new products. Short of catastrophic investment 
decisions like the ones made by the Daewoo Group in South Korea, 
conglomerates are unlikely to disappear. Even if one does, many others 
remain. By virtue of their vastness and multimarket operations, there would 
need to be simultaneous new entrants or new products in many markets to 
threaten a conglomerate, which is highly unlikely. Given the durable nature 
of conglomerates, intervention against their economic power is more justified 
than intervention against monopoly power. The problem is finding the right 
approach. Drawing a line based on size would be arbitrary and susceptible to 
circumvention. Yet there seems to be no better way to prevent the 
concentration of economic power in small and emerging economies. This is 
a conundrum that would require further serious thinking. 
 
